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
The Command and General Staff College in Transition, 1946-1976

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✓ This study attempts to analyze the changes occurring in the curriculum of the Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas from 1946 - 1976. The greatest emphasis in the study is placed on the period from 1972-1976.

The study concludes that the College has experienced a number of changes in its curriculum. These changes have centered on the relationship between education and training, the balancing of the generalist versus the specialist, and the broadening of the scope of instruction. ↗

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
Introduction	1
Chapter I: The College, 1946-1966	8
Chapter II: Movement Toward "Greater Flexibility," 1966-1973	32
Chapter III: The Environment for Change, 1973	55
Chapter IV: Getting Realism into the Classroom	72
Chapter V: Continuing Changes	90
Chapter VI: Doctrine and Training Developments	109
Chapter VII: Conclusion	126
TABLES	135
1. Hours of Instruction in Tactical Operations	
2. Content of Curriculum according to Staff Areas	
3. Turnover Among Colonels on Academic Committees, 1973-1976	
4. Regular Course Graduates, 1946-1976	
Bibliographic Essay	139
Selective Bibliography	141

INTRODUCTION

As one of America's oldest military schools, change has long been an important part of the tradition of the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. When the College was created by General William Tecumseh Sherman in 1881, its organization was designed to facilitate change. That is, General Sherman vetoed the idea of creating an academic board along the lines of the one at West Point. He insisted that the school at Leavenworth be completely under the control of the Commandant, rather than an entrenched bureaucratic body that might be overly resistant to change.¹ Since the nature of warfare continually evolves, Leavenworth was organized so the curriculum could keep pace with the changing doctrines, weapons, and modes of war. Even though General Sherman properly predicted the need for the institution to be responsive to the forces for change, his solution assumed the Commandant would have the power to determine the pace and direction of change. In reality, the power of the Commandant has shifted over the past century according to the personality of the incumbent and the obstacles facing him.

To understand the evolution of the College, one must recognize that change in this institution seems to occur in three phases. First, change is born in the mind of an "originator." Second, change is nurtured in the intellect of an "agent" who transmits the concept from the "originator" to the "doer." Finally, change achieves maturity in the hands of the

"doer" who quite often implements a concept significantly different from that generated by the "originator." It becomes readily apparent that even change changes between initiation and execution. Each Commandant has brought his own ideas and desires to Fort Leavenworth, and each has affected CGSC differently. At the same time each has been responsive to a variety of external influences. That is, the Commandant has not always been the "initiator" of change. In many cases, he has been the "agent," or even the "doer." Consequently, the nature, scope, method, and philosophy of instruction at Leavenworth has varied through the years as internal and external desires have influenced the evolution of the College. The one unvarying constant has perhaps been the demand for and pursuit of excellence.

The story of the changes occurring at the Command and General Staff College is a complicated one, for in the past thirty years almost every aspect of the College has been sculpted, weathered, or remodeled by the various forces of change. Due to its centrality in the mission of Leavenworth, the curriculum is constantly being molded by these forces for change. Each new Commandant has arrived at Leavenworth with his own philosophy of instruction that frequently related to the balancing of education and training. Education was often defined as instruction of the students in subjects that would enhance their knowledge of the art and science of war, and its purpose was viewed as enabling the student officer to understand broad principles underlying his profession. Training, on the other hand, emphasized preparation to perform specific military functions and tasks. Hence, it emphasized fundamentals, methods, and often memorization. Another continuing theme of change was the question of the generalist versus the specialist. The generalist was often viewed as the officer who was

well-trained in all aspects of general staff duties, while the specialist was considered to be the officer who had been prepared for a specific function or area of responsibility within the broad range of general staff duties. But the problem of the generalist versus the specialist sometimes became nothing more than a manifestation of a more fundamental question. What were the duties for which the Leavenworth graduate was being prepared? One area of change over which the Commandants often had little control was the scope of instruction. This encompassed a variety of problems including the instructional center of gravity, emphasis on that portion of the defense establishment outside the Army in the field, and the myriad of responsibilities of the Army officer which had not been included in military education when the school was founded. These three areas--education versus training, generalist versus specialist, and scope of instruction--have been the battleground for many of the changes imposed or implemented by the Commandants of CGSC over the past thirty years.

The nature of these changes are important not only to Fort Leavenworth, but to the entire Army. The value of the Command and General Staff College has frequently been noted, for as Major General John H. Cushman, Commandant from 1973-1976, was fond of saying, "Surely Leavenworth is at the heart and soul of the Army."² As one reviews the contribution of Leavenworth to the Army, he discovers this college to be of utmost importance in achieving reform and maintaining the readiness of the Army through military education. Leavenworth graduates have traditionally been reinvigorated with a sense of professionalism and an honest desire to apply what they have learned. Consequently, they have sometimes been used as "missionaries," carrying the seeds of new ideas for the modernization and improvement of the U.S. Army.

The contribution of the College to military operations first became apparent during World War I. As one American Expeditionary Force veteran explained, "It was World War I that put Leavenworth on the map!"³ One of the most eloquent testimonies concerning the significance of the College was made by General George C. Marshall. He explained:

"I finally got into the habit of study at Leavenworth, which I never really had before. I revived what little I had carried with me out of college and I became pretty automatic at the business...but it was the hardest work I ever did in my life."⁴

The Infantry and Cavalry School (as the College was then known) made a remarkable impression on Marshall, primarily due to his exposure to the ideas and methods of one of Leavenworth's most famous instructors, Major John F. Morrison. The influence of Morrison was readily acknowledged by many officers who were proud to say, "I was a Morrison man." General Marshall paid him his highest tribute when he stated, "He taught me all I have ever known of tactics."⁵

But it was the development of their thought process that was most important for Marshall and men like him. In an interview with his biographer, Forrest C. Pogue, General Marshall explained:

"My habits of thought were being trained. While...I learned little I could use..., I learned how to learn... I began to develop along more stable lines. Leavenworth was immensely instructive, not so much because the course was perfect--because it was not--but the association with the officers, the reading we did and the discussion and the leadership...of a man like Morrison had a tremendous effect, certainly on me, and I think on most of my class."⁶

Leavenworth continued to make a major contribution to the American military, and former Secretary of War, Robert P. Patterson, stated, "It is no exaggeration to say that our victories in World War II were won at Leavenworth... Here our great war leaders learned the art of combined arms, the handling

of large bodies of troops."⁷

One of the major reasons for this was the College's contribution to a unity of doctrine in the Army. Every graduate's thinking has been carefully molded by a detailed exposure to the estimate of the situation, the operations order, command and control techniques, and similar tactical ideas. While Leavenworth students have never been required to "think" alike and be able to react automatically to particular tactical situations, each has become intimately familiar with a common tactical language. This was particularly important during World War II when fluid and rapidly changing situations prevented minutely detailed planning. General Omar N. Bradley acknowledged this in his post-war work, A Soldier's Story.

"While mobility was the 'secret' U.S. weapon that defeated von Rundstedt in the Ardennes [in December 1944], it owed its effectiveness to the success of U.S. Army staff training. With divisions, corps, and Army staffs schooled in the same language, practices, and techniques, we could resort to sketchy oral orders with an assurance of perfect understanding between U.S. commands."⁸

As the center and focus of the Army's commander and staff training, the influence of Leavenworth on the American military has probably been unequalled by any other educational or training institution. Its past contribution to the development of a common language of tactics and administration has more than earned its recognition as the "keystone" in the Army's education and training of its officers. That importance continues in the nation's bicentennial year. The new name for Fort Leavenworth, "The Combined Arms Center," exemplifies the College's role as the senior Army School of combined arms and services. Due to the increasing complexity of the modern battlefield, the contemporary officer is insufficiently equipped for his future duties if he lacks an understanding of how to orchestrate the

multitudinous number of advanced weapons, fighting arms, and supporting services. As the focal point for education and training in the employment of all Army branches as an integrated fighting team, the Command and General Staff College remains the single most important educational experience for the U.S. Army officer.

Yet, every institution must adapt or evolve with the times, for they cannot unimaginatively rely on methods that have proved successful in the past but which may no longer be appropriate. This is especially true for those in the military, since an educational system that trains officers to fight can make no greater mistake than to prepare its graduates to fight the previous war, rather than the next one. The past success of Leavenworth in this endeavor has been a result of its willing acceptance of the ideal of unremitting improvement and adaptation to contemporary realities. The changing needs of the Army have necessitated constant reappraisal and revision of the College's program. Even though change has never been synonymous with improvement, the ability to change has ensured the modernization and continued progress of the Command and General Staff College.

Endnotes

Introduction

¹Timothy K. Nenninger, "The Fort Leavenworth Schools: Postgraduate Military Education and Professionalization in the U.S. Army, 1880-1920," Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1974, p. 27.

²Major General John H. Cushman, Commandant's Welcoming Remarks at the Opening Exercises for the Regular Course, 11 August 1975, p. 2.

³Major General C. P. Gross statement in "Comments by Members of the A.E.F.," Command and Commanders in Modern Warfare: Proceedings of the Second Military History Symposium, U.S. Air Force Academy (Washington, 1969), p. 71; quoted in Nenninger, "The Fort Leavenworth Schools," p. 347.

⁴Quoted in Forrest C. Pogue, George C. Marshall: Education of a General (New York: The Viking Press, 1963), p. 96.

⁵Ibid., p. 99.

⁶Ibid., p. 101.

⁷A Military History of the US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1881-1963, p. 46.

⁸General of the Army Omar N. Bradley, A Soldier's Story (New York: Popular Library, 1964), p. 464.

Chapter 1

The College, 1946-1966

From 1946 to 1966 there were a number of important changes in the mission and curriculum of the Command and General Staff College. While the initial changes thrust the College into the role of producing the generalist with specialist skills in one of the functional staff areas, the final changes returned it to producing the generalist who had been trained in all aspects of general staff duties but who had received most of his instruction in the study of tactical operations. Although the student spent many hours studying the corps and the field army, the preponderant portion of his instruction centered on the division. The general purpose of the College, then, from 1946 to 1966, was to produce the generalist, better trained in operations and in the duties of the commander and staff of the division than in other areas.

During World War II, Leavenworth conducted a war-time mobilization course designed to train officers for general staff duty primarily with the division. Since the exigencies of war demanded training, specialization, and a quantity of officers of sufficient quality, students attended one of three different ten week courses: air, ground, or service. More than 19,000 officers attended the special war-time classes. The arrival of peace signalled the return to Leavenworth's traditional role of providing a rigorous and detailed course of study in order to produce the quality staff officer and future commander, and in the interim period

from October 1945 to July 1946, a special, more advanced course called the Command Class was conducted. The new course lasted sixteen weeks, with two classes eventually completing the course, and was perhaps the most sophisticated course ever presented at the College. The special nature of this class is best indicated by the presence of student officers who had served as regimental commanders and corps and division G-3's during the recent war.

Since the Command Class had been designed as a high-level course for lieutenant colonels who were already familiar with general staff work and who had been specially selected for advanced command and staff training, its curriculum was oriented at a much higher level than that of the prewar or war period. The course consisted of a refresher phase called a "general review," followed by an analysis of selected operations during World War II, a study of the organization and functioning of the War Department, and instruction in theater planning. The traditional lectures and conferences were not emphasized, and the great majority of the instruction consisted of demonstrations, map/terrain exercises and maneuvers, committee work, and tutorials. Considering the elevated scope of the curriculum, the expertise and experience of the students, and the nature of the instruction, the role of the Command Class was closer to the traditional role of the Army War College, which had been disbanded before the war than it was to the traditional role of the Command and General Staff College. The CGSC course in the following years was never as sophisticated or advanced as the Command Class had been, but the curriculum from 1946-1950 continued to represent a compromise between the traditional instructional roles of the two collegiate institutions.

The first formal board after World War II to consider a plan for the postwar education system of the Army was headed by Lieutenant General Leonard T. Gerow, who became Commandant of CGSC in November 1945. The Gerow Board, which released its findings on February 5, 1946, recommended establishing an integrated school system extending from the basic branch schools to a National War College. As part of the progressive education of the Army officer, the role played by the prewar Command and General Staff College, according to the Gerow plan, would be transferred to a Ground College, probably located at Fort Benning, Georgia. Fort Leavenworth would be the center for an Armed Forces College concentrating on the "establishment and direction of theaters, and the most effective separate and combined strategic, tactical, and logistical employment of Air, Ground, Naval and Service Forces assigned thereto."¹ But some of the most important suggestions made by the Gerow Board were not accepted by the War Department.

One of the most important suggestions made by the Board, which was not accepted, concerned the mission of Fort Leavenworth. Although an Armed Forces College was eventually established elsewhere, the Kansas fort became the site of the Ground College. Also, the Gerow Board had recommended that the scope of instruction for the intended Ground College cover the "organization and employment of all types of divisions and the corps."² This suggested level of instruction coincided with the prewar scope of Fort Leavenworth, which had been limited to the corps. But the suggestion was rejected by the War Department, which oriented the content of the curriculum at a much higher level. A War Department circular, dated July 9, 1946, required instruction in the "effective development and

employment of all field forces within the framework of the army group."³ The College was also given the task of preparing "officers for duty as commanders and staff officers at the division and higher levels." This meant that the school had to provide a foundation for officers in any command or staff assignment from division to the War Department. The center of gravity of instruction was thus much higher than it had been prior to or during World War II, and the difficult task of educating the Leavenworth student was compounded.

The major reason for the elevation of the level of instruction was the decision to not reopen the Army War College, a suggestion made by the Gerow Board and accepted by the War Department. Prior to World War II, instruction on larger military units had been divided between the Command and General Staff College and the Army War College. Instruction in the division, corps, communications zone, and army was covered at Leavenworth, while the army group, army logistical problems at the theater level, zone of interior, and War Department functions were covered in the Army War College.⁴ Once the decision was made to create a National War College and not reopen the Army War College, the curriculum at Leavenworth had to be expanded to incorporate much of the important instruction previously presented by the more senior college.

Even though the mission of the Command and General Staff College after 1946 was much different from what was initially envisioned, the basic organization of the curriculum followed the suggestions made by the Gerow Board. That is, the school year was divided into a common phase of instruction lasting thirty weeks and a specialized⁵ phase lasting ten weeks. The Board

viewed this organization as a compromise between the needs for general and special skills or knowledge. Its report stated:

"The multiplicity of the modern means of warfare and their knitting together into one battle team requires a broader general knowledge than heretofore, and at the same time, the accelerated development of intricate equipment requires a greater specialization and technical knowledge to fully exploit the capabilities of modern equipment."6

The common phase would provide the "general knowledge" and the specialized phase, the "greater specialization and technical knowledge." Following the thirty weeks of common instruction the student would receive detailed instruction in one of four separate areas, coinciding with the traditional four staff areas--administration, intelligence, operations and training, and supply and maintenance.

The necessity to expand the scope of instruction, however, forced an alteration of the specialized phase. The instruction would not concentrate on lower level staffs, but would cover the functions and duties of the general staff at the army group, theater army, zone of interior, and War Department. During the specialized phase, each student would be assigned to one of four groups where he would receive instruction in one of the general staff areas for higher Army echelons. Consequently, there was some specialization, but it was not the alternative initially suggested by the Gerow Board. To implement the new plan, Leavenworth was divided into four "Schools" corresponding to the four staff areas. The Schools combined their efforts during the common phase of instruction but then reverted to teaching their own area during the specialized phase. For the common curriculum, the entire student body (about 300-400 officers) received instruction in one classroom, while the specialized instruction saw all the students of a particular

School receive instruction as a single group.

Although the overall result was a decreased emphasis on operations and an increased emphasis on the other staff areas, too much material had been crammed into the ten month Regular Course. What had previously been covered in two years (one year at the Command and General Staff College and one year at the Army War College) was now covered in one year. Another fundamental problem concerned the malassignment of Leavenworth graduates. In August 1948, Lieutenant General Manton S. Eddy, the new Commandant of CGSC, wrote General Jacob L. Devers, Chief of Army Field Forces, and explained:

"A check of the assignments of last year graduates reveals that of the 92 students assigned to the Department of the Army General Staff for duty 45 received instruction in a general Staff function (Schools of Personnel, Intelligence, Combined Arms, Logistics) other than the Department of the Army General Staff Division to which they were assigned."⁷

These problems were not resolved, and the need for further change soon became obvious.

Another Department of the Army Board on the Educational System for Officers was convened under Lieutenant General Eddy, and its report was published on 15 June 1949. In its discussion of the staff college, the Board emphasized the crowded nature of its curriculum and the insufficient time to cover the division, corps, and army. The Board noted that Leavenworth's specialized instruction on the general staff at the higher army echelons had a major shortcoming.

"At no place in the Army school system has he [the student] been given an objective view of the entire vast and complex machinery which makes up the Department of the Army. A critical analysis of the missions, doctrine, and techniques under which the Army operates can be accomplished only through a broad knowledge of the existing command and staff structure. Only through critical analysis by informed persons can real progress be made in the military art. The specialized phase does not provide this foundation."⁸

The alternative suggested by the Eddy Board was abolishing the specialized phase and reestablishing the Army War College. The mission of the Command and General Staff College would be correspondingly reduced; the College would concentrate on the task of teaching the "duties of the commander and general staff of the division, corps, army, and comparable levels of the communications zone." The Army War College would "include instruction in the duties of the commanders and staffs of the higher Army echelons..., such as the army group, theater army headquarters, zone of interior, and Headquarters, Department of the Army, with emphasis on Department of the Army."⁹

Most of the recommendations were immediately implemented. The Army War College was reconstituted in 1950, and its first academic year was conducted at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. The nucleus of its faculty was drawn from the personnel of CGSC who were most experienced in high level staff assignments. As for the staff college, the original common phase of the curriculum was expanded and became the core, mandatory curriculum for all students. Specialization was not again attempted within the curriculum until the late 1960's. The Eddy Board concluded, "The extra time gained through the elimination of the Specialized Phase will permit the necessary increase in time devoted to the fighting units, particularly the division level."¹⁰ The ten weeks previously devoted to the study of the general staff at the higher Army echelons were now devoted to the lower echelons, primarily the division. The scope of the curriculum dropped noticeably.

The increase in the amount of tactical instruction for Academic Year 1950-1951 at the division, corps, and army level is reflected in Table 1. As shown in this table, a total of 374 hours in the 1949-1950 common curriculum was devoted to the lower Army echelons. Those specializing in combined

arms at the higher echelons would have received more than 300 additional hours in instruction on operations. With the reestablishing of the Army War College and the ending of the specialization phase, the total hours of common tactical instruction increased dramatically to 652 hours, with 413 of those hours being devoted to the division. This concentration on the division was nothing new, for as Table 1 also demonstrates, the preponderant part of Leavenworth's tactical instruction over the past four decades has concentrated on the division. Although the center of gravity of the scope of instruction may have shifted slightly, the focus has not drastically moved away from the division. Classes were sometimes conducted on the armored cavalry regiment, the airborne brigade, or the battalion-sized unit in a counterinsurgency environment, but the instruction from 1946 to 1966 was almost totally devoted to division and above.

Table 2 shows that in Academic Year 1946-1947, 39.5% of the common instruction was devoted to operations. (This does not include the instruction received in the specialized phase.) By 1953-1954, operations instruction had increased to 53.8%, though it declined to 42% by 1966. In contrast, logistics instruction, which had comprised 35.1% of the common curriculum in 1946-1947, declined to 16% by 1966. Operations, as opposed to the other staff areas, dominated the curriculum from 1946 to 1966.

The emphasis on operations and on the division remained an integral and important part of the curriculum for the next two decades. In 1958 the Command and General Staff College told the Williams Board (another Department of the Army investigation of officer education and training):

"The division is the heart of the USACGSC curriculum and the foundation of its tactical instruction. Division is the level where the general staff and the combined arms and services first coalesce."¹¹

This had been the view in the past and was to remain the view in the future. Hence, the College continued to produce the generalist who had received most of his training in division operations. The emphasis was on the traditional role of the general staff officer as a coordinator or even controller of the diverse arms and services of the division. This was to be the foundation of the Leavenworth graduate's education upon which he was to base his further development.

For a time in the 1950's, Leavenworth was again "threatened" by the possibility of specialization. This possibility appeared when the notion of a "gap" between the instructional areas of the war college and the staff college emerged. While the Eddy Board had sought to specify the areas of responsibility of the two colleges, some confusion existed. Major General H. L. McBride, Commandant of CGSC, succinctly described the problem in a letter to Lieutenant General Edward M. Almond, Commandant of the War College:

"I feel our school system gives reasonably good coverage of tactical and strategical instruction but I see a definite gap in the logistical field, particularly the Communications Zone. Communications Zone instruction appears to fall within the scope of both the Command and General Staff College and the Army War College. We cannot materially increase our instruction in that field without sacrificing our tactical instruction. I understand you feel the same regarding Army War College instruction."¹²

Several possible solutions were presented, one of these being the establishment of a logistics course at CGSC. After the departure of the Army War College from Fort Leavenworth in 1951, sufficient facilities were available for an extra 4½ month course with a capacity of 350 students to be conducted in the spring months. There was also some discussion of establishing two Leavenworth courses, one emphasizing "combat" and the other, "logistics." But this suggested specialization, and Leavenworth soon decided

it preferred to increase the logistical coverage of the Regular Course. One officer explained, "For a long-term solution it appears that improvement of our general course coverage is better than a return to specialization, which was tried and found wanting during World War II."¹³ The threat of a separate logistics course did not end until the early 1960's, but the idea of the specialist never replaced the idea of the generalist.

The college's philosophy was succinctly expressed in a draft response to one of the questions from the Williams Board of 1958:

"Speaking about the level of the Command and General Staff College, there is a danger that in an age of increased specialization, education at this level may tend to become specialized. For example, the question has been raised as to whether there should be a separate logistics school at the general staff level. .../T/he relation between tactics and logistics at the level of combined arms and services is so intimate that overspecialization at this level must be avoided... /An/ increase in specialization generates an even greater need for officers with the broad approach required to combine all these specialties into an integrated whole...

"The 'generalist' approach is characteristic of the commander and the general staff officer. Since these officers must be produced by the Army School System, education at the level of the Command and General Staff College must remain in the 'generalist' approach."¹⁴

The College firmly believed that the Eddy Board of 1949 had established the Branch Schools as the centers for the branch specialists and Leavenworth as the center for the generalist, the combined arms expert. This remained the Leavenworth ideal.

Another crucial question concerned the College's role in the training of commanders. As a result of the Eddy Board of 1949, the mission of the Command and General Staff college became teaching "duties of the commander and general staff of the division, corps, army and comparable levels of the communications zone."¹⁵ By 1966, this mission remained essentially the

same. AR 350-5 described the College's mission in 1966:

"To prepare selected officers of all components of the Army for peacetime and wartime duty as commanders and general staff officers of division, corps, and field army, including their logistical systems, the communications zone, and its subordinate elements, and to familiarize them with the activities of the theater army replacement system."¹⁶

While the mission of Leavenworth had been increased by the responsibility for teaching the communications zone and the theater army replacement system, its prime mission continued to be the preparation of officers as commanders and general staff officers of division, corps, and field army. In reality, however, College instruction concentrated on the division.

The controversy within the Leavenworth community concerned preparing student officers as commanders of units larger than a division. The 1956 Educational Survey Commission, composed of noted academicians and retired general officers, brought this question to a head. It recommended that the mission of CGSC be changed to read as follows:

"To provide learning experiences for selected officers appropriate to the wartime functions of division commanders and general staff officers of divisions, corps, army, and comparable levels in the communications zone."¹⁷

The commission believed that Leavenworth should concentrate on the functions of command at division level, rather than higher levels. It explained that no one at the College believed that Leavenworth graduates were capable of commanding a corps or army immediately upon graduation. While the average graduate was prepared to act as a general staff officer, especially at division and corps level, he simply was not prepared for high-level command. A subordinate element of this argument was one that had been argued many times at Leavenworth. That is, can an officer be "trained" to be a commander

of a division, corps, or army. There were some who accepted the belief expressed by one officer in 1951; "No amount of academic instruction can make a commander; therefore, the curriculum should be designed primarily to instruct the student in the duties of the staff."¹⁸ This sentiment was on the decline, however, and its demise is perhaps marked by the 1961 renaming of the Department of Staff and Educational Subjects as the Department of Command.

While not accepting the idea that commanders could not be trained, Major General Garrison H. Davidson, Commandant of CGSC from 1954-1956, agreed with the idea of limiting the mission of CGSC to preparing students as future commanders of divisions, rather than of corps and armies. He explained that the curriculum content was already over-loaded. The teaching of atomic as well as non-atomic warfare had vastly extended the scope of instruction, and it needed to be reduced. The succeeding commandant, Major General Lionel C. McGarr objected to limiting the mission. He argued:

"The broader terms in which the mission is now stated...are more adaptable to the changing requirements of warfare and provide the commandant with essential flexibility in operating the college."¹⁹

The attempt to eliminate the responsibility for training corps and army commanders was thus defeated by the idea of retaining flexibility for the commandant to institute changes he deemed necessary.

Nonetheless, the College did not believe it was in fact training corps and army commanders. Major General McGarr fully explained that the portion of the mission dealing with command did "not imply that graduates should necessarily be fully qualified to command divisions, corps, or field armies at the time of graduation."²⁰ Leavenworth could only provide the basis for the future "growth and development" of the graduate as a commander, and

perhaps even as a general staff officer for some higher Army levels. The College mission was not interpreted as requiring complete preparation of higher echelon commanders or staff officers; education and subsequent assignments would further the development of the individual for such duties. One officer carefully described Leavenworth's role in this process:

"We instruct officers here with the interest of giving them a good understanding of the overall picture of tactics and the principles of logistical support to field units. We want our students to know the principles and the inter-relation of army doctrine in all the important facets of the field army. However, in ten months our students can only be given the overall platform on which to build if they are to go on to the top."²¹

An inherent part of this problem for the Command and General Staff College revolved around the balancing of education and training. During World War I., Leavenworth had functioned as a training school for the production of a large quantity of graduates prepared to perform the function of general staff officers. From 1946 to 1966, training continued to be emphasized more than education, especially in the first decade after the war. The training portion of the curriculum was devoted to teaching staff procedures, functions, and techniques, as well as capabilities and limitations of the various combat arms and services. These skills could be utilized immediately or in the future by a commander or a staff officer. In the education portion of the curriculum, the officer learned basic concepts and principles and applied his knowledge to the solving of problems as a commander or as a general staff officer. The education portion thus was designed for the intellectual development of the student. The College always sought to achieve a balance between the differing needs of education and training. What changed, however, was the perception of the "proper" balance between education and training.

Major General McGarr, Commandant from 1956--1960, probably emphasized education over training more than most of his predecessors and many of his successors, and he clearly described the educational mission of the College:

"This mission requires special attention in the following areas: focus the design of the curriculum primarily on development of knowledge and understanding as opposed to acquisition of facts and skills; provide indoctrination in procedures and facts as an initial step; and exert major effort on developing a grasp of the cause, the why, and the wherefore of the principles and reasoning on which facts and procedures depend for their meaning."²²

This view became increasingly prevalent, and in 1962 Dr. Evan J. Birrer, the College Educational Adviser, stated:

"As a fundamental strategy we have determined that our major responsibility is to provide our students problem-solving experience--or stated differently, to educate them for their future duties..., rather than to train them in the mechanics of staff procedures."²³

While Dr. Birrer's views were perhaps distorted by his own position within the College, the pendulum of change was slowly moving from the training side of the spectrum to the education side. According to Dr. Birrer, the College's role by the mid-1960's had evolved into one of producing "competent military problem solvers."²⁴

But the problem for Leavenworth has always been that it is easier to train than to educate. To challenge the unique and highly-qualified student requires a close student-instructor relationship and massive preparation by the instructor. When budget cuts or bureaucratic demands have reduced the number of instructors or have preoccupied the instructor, the level of education has always declined. And the return to the Army has been adjusted proportionally, if not geometrically. The ideal, however, has usually been one of providing the platform upon which the officer can base his future professional development.

The Educational Survey Commission of 1956 furnished an excellent criticism of how the College has sometimes become overburdened with the secondary, at the expense of the primary. The Commission explained:

"In the process of attempting to achieve perfection, the College has, in the opinion of the Commission, lost sight of some of its objectives, has overcrowded the curriculum, and has overburdened both faculty and student body."²⁵

One of the Commission's major findings was the following:

"The Commission believes that the typical College instructional methods are not completely harmonious with the College educational mission. Specifically, it considers that, on the whole, the present College classroom methods are more suited to the branch schools and undergraduate training than to the best graduate schools."²⁶

While all the recommendations of this august body were not accepted by the school, its findings are clear evidence that much remained to be done to improve the Command and General Staff College.

Perhaps the most important part of creating the proper learning environment in the classroom has been the methods of instruction employed. Major General Lionel C. McGarr addressed this subject in 1959 and concluded:

"No matter how modern and excellent the content of a curriculum may be, it can be no more effective than the methods used to teach it. In fact, in an institution whose mission in part is professional military intellectual development including the development of decision making ability, methods of instruction are at least as important as course content."²⁷

Following World War II, the major portion of the instruction at Leavenworth was given by lecturers to the entire class as a group. With more than 300 students, the emphasis was predominantly on passive learning. The class was often broken down into smaller groups of eight or ten students for map exercises, but these groups essentially were undirected, usually working without an instructor. After reaching a solution to the requirement,

all work groups reassembled enmasse to discuss their solution. While this method was obviously better than a lecture on the subject, the reassembling of the class was hardly conducive to an indepth analysis of the reasoning process underlying solutions. The result was very little participation by the individual, who often became diluted and anonymous among the large class. Tutorials were used, but these were predominantly reviews. The Educational Survey Commission of 1946-1947 complained:

"It is unfortunate that the tutorial is regarded primarily as a review of official doctrine for examination or other purposes, rather than as an opportunity to utilize the varied backgrounds and special knowledge of the group in original problem-solving exercises."²⁸

The College recognized the shortcomings of the huge classes, and in 1948 adopted a smaller class system. The students were divided into twelve sections, and increased emphasis was placed on participation by each student. While the size of the sections precluded the establishing of close rapport between the instructor and the individual student, that relationship was much closer than it had been in the mass class. This emphasis on the small section was to remain the Leavenworth ideal for the next three decades, but the essential problem was the tremendous increase in the number of instructor hours. The 1946-1947 and 1947-1948 classes had each required about 4100 hours of instructor time per year, but the class of 1948-1949 with its twelve sections required 15,200.²⁹ This placed an especially heavy load on the instructors, who had actually declined in number from 144 in November 1946 and 151 in September 1947, to 141 in September 1948. But the environment for learning had undoubtedly been improved, and the predominant method of instruction used over the next few years was the lecture/conference with an instructor directing limited discussion within each of the twelve sections.

One unfortunate unintended result of the small sections was increased emphasis on the lesson plan and on each of the twelve presentations being identical. The problem was generated by the necessity to rank all students by class standing. The College apparently felt that in order to do this fairly all twelve sections had to be presented the same material. According to one contemporary observer, this was carried to such an extreme that at one time instructions were issued requiring each of the twelve instructors to be covering the same subject at the same time.³⁰ This demand for stringent uniformity undoubtedly detracted from some of the gains accomplished by the small sections. The excessive adherence to the meticulously prepared lesson plans came under intense criticism from the 1956 Educational Survey Commission, which concluded:

"The College should discontinue its requirement for apparent identity and free the instructors so that they can develop the desired initiative, resourcefulness, and originality in teaching and in the promotion of learning that we deem essential to the accomplishment of the College mission."³¹

But the necessity for uniform instruction ensured the continued dominance of the lesson plan.

A major step forward was made in the mid-1950's when a concerted effort was made to consistently use small work groups within each section. The twelve sections were sub-divided into four groups of twelve to fourteen students, and each work group was separated by curtains. Sliding mapboards and blackboards were introduced so each work group could function by itself. A group leader, either an instructor or a student, was designated for each work group session, which usually took the form of a small group discussion, a committee, or a staff exercise. Although the lecture

and the conference still dominated instruction, a marked improvement in the utilization and advancement of the skills of the Leavenworth student was made, and the changes were welcomed by the student body.³² The use of small work groups was furthered in January 1959 when the new academic building, Bell Hall, was officially opened. Each section room could easily be divided with curtains into four work groups.

In the following years, Leavenworth continued to concentrate on its instructional methods, but the major problem remained one of getting enough instructors for all the work groups in the twelve sections. Faced with a shortage of instructors, it often was necessary to present a lecture or a conference, rather than employ the small group method. Nevertheless, the ideal remained one of creating an environment in the classroom that was most conducive to learning. In 1962 the Eddleman Commission, which had surveyed the College, concluded: "CGSC's present position of leadership with respect to instructional methods, instructors, instructional aids, and facilities should be maintained."³³ The actual situation, however, was not so encouraging. One former CGSC student described his view of the situation:

"The perception of a student taught tactics could be summarized in one word--frustration. There were maximum lectures, minimum practical exercises, a fictitious and unreal enemy, an organization base that was difficult to equate to (we always were at 100% strength and no shortages of equipment while the enemy was on the run.) The principal objectives of the majority of the students was to learn the key words, pass the examinations and 'get back to the real world.'"³⁴

Problems for which CGSC had no immediate solution continued to exist. Some problems, in fact, were generated by the basic nature of the Leavenworth curriculum. For example, the ideal of producing the generalist among a

student body of widely varying talent, experience, and interest often resulted in compromise presentations that neither appealed to the uninterested nor challenged the experienced. The notion that all students regardless of branch required the same instruction created remarkable problems for the instructor and for the student. Similarly, even with twelve sections of 50 men, the odds of a student being called on to actively participate were small, and one officer concluded: "Many students found this far from being an intellectual challenge; most did not even do their homework, since the chance of being called on in the lecture environment was remote."³⁵ The final result was too often boredom caused by the irksome monotony of the classroom. This criticism, however, should be tempered by the realization that Leavenworth has never graduated a "bad" class. But there are different degrees of success, and there have been years when Leavenworth could have done better.

The College, nonetheless, was slowly changing, and the best example of its broadening horizons is the establishment of the Master of Military Art and Science (MMAS) Program. This program was begun while Major General Harold K. Johnson was commandant and was inaugurated in Academic Year 1963-1964. Its objectives were:

- "Make significant research contributions to the discipline, military art and science.
- "Provide an appropriate award (master's degree) for scholarly achievement.
- "Enhance research competence."³⁶

Students in the MMAS program were required to write an original thesis and pass a comprehensive examination on the CGSC course. As the years passed, the program became a special point of pride within the curriculum, and

after years of effort, degree granting authorization was finally acquired. Congress gave its approval on July 31, 1974, and the President signed the bill into law on August 5, 1974. In March 1976, the College received accreditation from the North Central Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools. Thus, this important educational program was a lasting legacy of early efforts in the 1960's to strengthen and vitalize the Leavenworth curriculum.

While the purpose of this study is not to present an indepth analysis of the organizational changes at the Command and General Staff College, it should be recognized that the College underwent a number of organizational changes between 1946 and 1966. The four "schools" formed in 1946 evolved into seven numbered (rather than titled) departments by 1952; in 1957 there were eight departments with official titles. In the early 1960's several reorganizations occurred, resulting in four academic departments (Command, Division Operations, Larger Unit Operations, and Joint, Combined, and Special Operations). This basic organization lasted through 1972.

The years from 1946 to 1966 thus established the basis for the developments of the following decade. By 1966 Leavenworth had settled firmly into a pattern of producing the generalist predominantly trained in operations, and even though the scope of instruction had been expanded to include every unit from division to army group, the focus of instruction remained on the division. As shown in Table 2, that portion of the curriculum devoted to the traditional staff areas of personnel, intelligence, operations, and logistics from the early 1950's through 1966 gradually decreased, while studies outside the traditional staff areas increased. This signals the

vast increase in the scope of the curriculum which had already begun and which was to reach new heights in the following decade. Perhaps this realization, that military education must look beyond the traditional boundaries of military concerns, is the most important legacy of these two important decades.

ENDNOTES

CHAPTER ONE

¹Lieutenant General Leonard T. Gerow, "Report of War Department Military Education Board on Education System for Officers of the Army," (Gerow Board) 1946, p. 37.

²Ibid., p. 59.

³War Department Circular, Number 202, 9 July 1946.

⁴Lieutenant General Manton S. Eddy, "Report of the Department of the Army Board on Educational System for Officers, 15 June 1949," (Eddy Board) p. 37.

⁵While this phase was described as "specialized" from 1946-1950, a more appropriate term would be "functionalized," since the student concentrated in various functional areas.

⁶Gerow Board, p. 52.

⁷Lieutenant General Manton S. Eddy to General Jacob L. Devers, 5 August 1948.

⁸Eddy Board, p. 38.

⁹Major General Edward F. Witsell (The Adjutant General) to Commandant, Command and General Staff College, 26 October 1949. (R-13423.2)

¹⁰Eddy Board, p. 41.

¹¹Reply to Williams Board Questionnaire, Tab 1A-1-5 (N-13423.139-C)

¹²Major General H. L. McBride to Lieutenant General Edward M. Almond, 21 January 1952 (N-13423.5-B).

¹³Colonel O. Z. Tyler, Jr. (Deputy Director for Plans and Evaluation), Staff Study, The Gap in Instruction between the Army War College and the Command and General Staff College, 7 April 1952 (N-13423.5-B)

- ¹⁴Discussion Topics for DA Review Board, 18 February 1958, Tab 12 (N-13423.139-2).
- ¹⁵Witsell to Commandant, CGSC, 26 October 1949.
- ¹⁶Quoted in Lieutenant General Ralph E. Haines, Jr., "Report of the Department of the Army Board to Review Army Officer Schools, February 1966," (Haines Board) Vol. II, p. 218.
- ¹⁷Dr. Jacob S. Orleans, "Report of the Educational Survey Commission, Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1956." p. 8 (N-13423.90-A-2)
- ¹⁸Colonel Albert S. Britt, Staff Study, College Mission, 7 July 1951, p.2 (N-13423.5-A)
- ¹⁹Major General Lionel C. McGarr (Commandant, CGSC) "Final Recommendations of the Commandant, USA CGSC, on the Report of the Educational Survey Commission, 1 January 1957," (N-13423.90-13) p. 8.
- ²⁰Major General Lionel C. McGarr (Commandant, CGSC), "Special Report of the Commandant, 1 January 1959," (N-13423.178-2) p. 13.
- ²¹Remarks by Colonel Clapper at Seminar on Mission, CGSC, 8 January 1955, pp. 13-14 (N-13423.42).
- ²²Major General Lionel C. McGarr, "End of Tour Report of the Commanding General, Fort Leavenworth, and Commandant, United States Army Command and General Staff College, 1960," p. 26 (N-13423.247-B).
- ²³Dr. Ivan J. Birrer, "Educational Methods and Student Evaluation Procedures," in General C. D. Eddleman, "Report of the Educational Survey Commission of the United States Army Command and General Staff College, 1962," (Eddleman Commission) p. 22 (N-13423.303-5).

²⁴Ibid.

²⁵Orleans, "Educational Survey Commission, 1956," p. 16.

²⁶Ibid., p. 5.

²⁷McGarr, "Special Report, 1 January 1959," p. 47.

²⁸Dr. Edwin R. Henry, "Survey of the Educational Program, The Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas," February 1947," (Henry Board) p. 36. (R-13423.7-2).

²⁹Colonel Orville Z. Tyler, Jr., "The Development of the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1937 to 1951, "Unpublished Master's Thesis, American University, June 1952, p. 65. (N-17204.2)

³⁰Ibid., p. 66.

³¹Orleans, "Educational Survey Commission, 1956," p. 19.

³²McGarr, "Special Report, 1 January 1959," p. 51.

³³Eddleman Commission, 1962, p. 19.

³⁴Colonel Clyde J. Tate, "Teaching Tactics: A New Approach," Student Essay, US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, 15 October 1975, p. 14.

³⁵Ibid., p. 11.

³⁶"Institutional Self Study, U. S. Army Command and General Staff College, September 1975," Vol. I, p. 140.

Chapter 2

Movement Toward "Greater Flexibility", 1966-1973

The year 1966 is the benchmark for the beginning of a new era at the Command and General Staff College, for it was in this year that the Department of the Army Board to Review Army Officer Schools, under the presidency of Lieutenant General Ralph E. Haines, Jr., made its landmark recommendations. Though the pendulum of change had already begun to swing, it was the Haines Board recommendations of 1966 which gave the biggest impulse to this pendulum and which became the charter for further change in the following decade.

A clear example of the early sentiment for change is the discussion by Major General Lionel C. McGarr in his Special Report of the Commandant of 1 January 1959. In that report, Major General McGarr emphasized the increasing importance of preparing the graduate for peace, as well as for war. He stated:

"With the advent of more complex and costly organizations and equipment, the task of training leaders at levels appropriate to their responsibilities in the 'peacetime' management of men and material has increased in importance. This is not a new element of the mission; it is a part of the preparation of commanders and staff officers for war as implied in AR 350-5. It did, however, require some new emphasis."¹

Similarly, the 1962 Educational Survey Commission under General C. D. Eddleman emphasized the importance of training leaders for both wartime and peacetime duties.² New subjects were slowly introduced into the curriculum. A class on automatic data processing was first conducted in Academic Year 1964-1965, and instruction in management techniques slowly

increased. Parallel with increased American involvement in Southeast Asia, the number of pure hours of instruction in counterinsurgency grew from 26 in 1962-1963 to 88 in 1966-1967. At the same time there was a marked increase in strategic studies, which increased from 24 hours in 1961-1962 to 95 hours in 1966-1967. These changes were undoubtedly a reflection of the increasingly broad role expected of the Army officer.

Recognition of the need for skills outside the traditional staff areas gradually affected the curriculum, and Table 2 illustrates that while 5% of the curriculum in Academic Year 1959-1960 was devoted to subjects other than the four staff areas, approximately 25% of the curriculum was devoted to the "other" area by 1965-1966. Many of the subjects included in the "other" area were, of course, not peculiar only to peacetime activities, but an ever-greater percentage came from outside the traditional staff areas.

While the Haines Board perceived a need for further change, it emphasized its agreement with previous Department of the Army Boards on the role of the Command and General Staff College. Specifically, it stated it was "fully in accord" with the concept expressed by the 1958 Williams Board, and quoted the following from that Board's report:

"As a matter of basic policy, the Board confirms that the USACGSC should remain as the keystone in the education and training of selected officers in the tactical application of the combined arms and services. The proven reputation of 'Leavenworth' as the place where ground commanders learn the art of battlefield command should be perpetuated. The USACGSC course should continue to be a vigorous, exacting course where selected officers learn those elements of command and staff that enable the complex and diverse elements of the US Army to be directed and controlled to a single purpose."³

The recommendations of the 1966 Board were not designed to alter this traditional role of the Command and General Staff College and were qualified with the following remark.

"The Haines Board does not intend that the main theme and emphasis of the CGSC course be reoriented, but rather that greater flexibility be added to the course to keep it fully responsive to the demands of a rapidly changing military environment."⁴

The long-term result, however, was to be more far-reaching than simply adding "greater flexibility."

The underlying theme of the Haines Board recommendations for Leavenworth was, "The experience level of student officers at the CGSC has risen substantially over the past 20 years."⁵ Since the pre-World War II Army had only a few divisions and no corps or armies, the Command and General Staff College in the interwar period had provided officers with necessary instruction in the handling of larger military units. After World War II, however, the Army had divisions, corps, and armies. Consequently, the Haines Board argued that the preponderant part of the officers attending Leavenworth in the 1960's had already acquired "a substantial level of knowledge and understanding" of the operations of larger units. This conclusion was also supported by the recognition that Leavenworth students had previously received instruction (in the various advanced courses) on the functioning of the general staff at division level.

From the Haines Board's perspective, this increased qualification and experience of the Leavenworth student permitted a modification of the Command and General Staff curriculum and mission. The College had traditionally

focused on the Army in the field, but the Board recommended that the focus be broadened to include high level commands and organizations outside the structure of the Army in the field. These included Department of the Army, combined and joint staffs, the Continental Army Command, and a number of other commands and agencies such as the US Army Materiel Command, the US Army Combat Developments Command, and the Defense Supply Agency. The Board concluded, "Graduates [of Leavenworth] . . . must be versatile and knowledgeable in procedures and concepts that go far beyond the operation of the Army in the field."⁶

But there is a limit in the amount of material that can be included in ten months of instruction. To make space for the numerous additional hours required to instruct the Leavenworth student in operations beyond the Army in the field, the Board recommended that additional general staff and division instruction be included in the career course and that a mandatory CGSC extension course be established. These would absorb much of the division level instruction and would create space in the Leavenworth curricula for the requisite new instruction. Even though the mandatory CGSC extension course was never established, the Board's recommendations did refocus the curriculum to include subjects previously not covered at Fort Leavenworth. Consequently, the scope of the CGSC curriculum greatly increased over the next few years. In contrast to the Gerow Board of 1946, which had sought an emphasis on the division and corps, the Haines Board thrust Leavenworth into an arena running the gamut from division to Department of the Army. No longer would there be specific concentration

on the Army in the field.

As for the specific recommendations made by the Haines Board, the one concerning the introduction of electives was to have the greatest effect. Leavenworth immediately recognized this and stated as much in its reply to the Commanding General, Continental Army Command.

"The Board's recommendations pertaining to electives, if adopted, will have a greater impact on CGSC than any other recommendation. A good many practices heretofore considered relatively sacrosanct would, of necessity, be modified. Examples are: all students receive the same instruction; all students take the same examinations; all regular school time is scheduled; all classroom instructors are military. Notwithstanding the intensity of the impact of the proposition, the introduction of electives is basically a desirable course of action."⁷

While describing the electives as "desirable," the College initially took a very limited view of the proposal. At a decision briefing on 31 March 1966, the Commandant, Major General Harry J. Lemley, Jr., stated, "I don't look on it [the electives] as being likely to blossom. I don't envisage every student in the class having the option of electives."⁸ But the ideas of the Haines Board, especially on electives, were to provide the impulse for change that was to occupy Fort Leavenworth for the following decade.

The rationale underlying the Board's recommendations on electives was not greatly different from that of the Gerow Board of 1946 which had recommended specialization within a framework of generalization, but the need to confront the rapid pace of change in the tactical, technological, and strategic environment had become more evident in the succeeding twenty years. With the increasing complexity of military organizations and equipment, the task of educating the complete generalist had evolved into

an extraordinarily difficult task. The curriculum of CGSC was clear evidence of this, for the usual diet of staff functions and tactics had been supplemented with exotic delicacies such as automatic data processing, operations research, nuclear weapons employment, and international relations. Just as the duties of the commander and general staff officer had increased in complexity, so had the curriculum. An electives program offered the advantage of reducing the proliferation of specialist courses and new subjects within the Army schooling system.

The electives program, however, was not an attempt to abandon the essential idea of the generalist. The Board considered the possibility of separate courses for operation, logistics, and administration; it also considered dividing the Leavenworth course into two segments (G2-G3 and G1-G4) during the latter portion of the course. The Board rejected both ideas and explained:

"Neither of the ideas is as appropriate as the present system which produces commanders and general staff officers who have a thorough and balanced grounding in the roles, responsibilities and functions of each general staff officer and of the general staff as an integrated entity."⁹

The Leavenworth graduate would still be a generalist, but at the same time an electives program would provide him additional, specialist skills.

A major advantage of the elective system, according to the Haines Board, was the challenge and opportunity it could provide the better student. Many hours of instructor-dominated classes often caused these students to become bored, since the instructors often had to direct their presentation toward the average student. This kept the slower student from becoming completely lost,

but it did little for the more capable officer. With the opportunity to have at least some selection of courses to be taken, the better students would find the course a more enriching and rewarding experience. Another inherent advantage was the ability to permit the student to select courses that would fill in or buttress any weak areas he had identified in his own training. The Board firmly believed an electives program would result in a better-prepared graduate.

Electives were first added to the College curriculum in Academic Year 1967-1968, with students being permitted to take one elective. A total of 17 electives were offered, with each course consisting of 40 hours of instruction. Course offerings varied from Military History, to Operations Research/Systems Analysis, to Advanced Logistics, to Evolution of Combat Formations, to various foreign languages. Extension subcourses in such subjects as Personnel Management, Maintenance Management, and Military Comptrollership were also offered as part of the 17 electives. As for the purpose of the electives, the Program of Instruction for 1967-1968 stated:

"The electives program is designed to accomplish one or more of the following purposes: extend the depth of coverage in selected areas of the curriculum; round-out previous schooling or experience; assist in development of a specialty; further the student's branch qualification; or satisfy intellectual curiosity."¹⁰

The addition of the 40 hours of electives did not substantially modify the traditional curriculum, since the amount of "open time" and "commandant's time" was reduced in order to accommodate the additional instruction. The number of actual hours devoted to academic subjects increased from the 1340 of the previous year to 1412. In short, the students spent more hours

in the classroom when electives were first added, and as shown in Table 1, the amount of hours spent on tactical instruction actually increased.

A reversal occurred in the following year when the elective program apparently began to affect the core curriculum. The number of academic hours was reduced from 1412 to 1310 in AY 1968-1969 and the amount of tactical instruction on the division, corps, and army declined from 405 to 330. This level of tactical instruction, about 300 hours, was to remain relatively constant through Academic Year 1971-1972. While an elective on Airmobile operation was available after AY 1968-1969, the number of hours of tactical instruction never approached the previous high levels, especially the more than 600 hours of the early 1950's.

The elective program also apparently affected the writing program. In Academic Year 1965-1966, academic subject time had been increased by 200 hours to provide students the opportunity to research and prepare a long paper. Consequently, the number of instructional hours rose from 1144 to 1344, the additional three hours being devoted to more instruction in automatic data processing. This requirement continued until Academic Year 1969-1970 when instruction in the Communicative Arts was reduced to 27 hours. In that year, students needing additional instruction were identified and required to prepare a staff study in addition to regular requirements, and the total number of academic subject hours decreased to 1141. Rather than have the entire student body devote a major portion of the curriculum to the communicative arts, those identified as being weak in this area were required to receive additional instruction. Thus, the writing program offers one of the clearest and earliest

examples of the electives program--as the Haines Board had originally suggested--providing "flexibility" to the Leavenworth curriculum. Needless to say, those not requiring the additional instruction in the communicative arts probably viewed this step as "enriching" the curriculum.

The electives program slowly expanded after its initiation in 1967-1968, and civilian universities began to participate. During the program's first year the University of Kansas provided much of the instruction, and in the following year students in four of the electives taught by that university received graduate credit. The number of possible electives grew from 17 in the first year to 23 in the second and then was reduced to 21 in AY 1969-1970. In AY 1970-1971, students were permitted to take two electives, each totalling 45 hours and the number of possible electives increased to 24. Electives now comprised 90 hours of the 1140 total academic subject hours of the curriculum, with the additional 45 hours of electives instruction primarily coming at the expense of the Communicative Arts instruction in the common curriculum, which was reduced to a mere five hours. In AY 1971-1972 students were again permitted to take two electives, but the possible choices had increased to 49.

By AY 1971-1972, the Command and General Staff College had measurably broadened its curriculum in order to prepare the Leavenworth student for service in areas other than the Army in the field. Progressive steps had also been taken to add "flexibility" and to "enrich" the curriculum. Accomplishing these had entailed devoting 8% of the course to student electives and increasing the amount of instruction on echelons of the Army not in the field, while decreasing instruction on special weapons, staff fundamentals and tactical

operations of the division. The pace of change, however, was soon to accelerate remarkably.

Another Department of Army Review of the Army Officer Educational System was conducted in 1971 by Major General Frank W. Norris, who had served on the CGSC faculty from 1950-1953 and whose last assignment had been as Commandant of the Armed Forces Staff College. General Norris' report was published on 1 December 1971, and the discussion of CGSC initially presented a very favorable view, not different from previous Department of the Army Reviews.

"CGSC has traditionally occupied a pivotal role in the Army school system. It now enjoys a preeminent reputation among the military schools of the free world. This reputation has developed primarily because Leavenworth has proven itself--it has consistently produced students who are thorough professionals. The Leavenworth diploma has become a hallmark of military excellence."¹¹

But beneath this praise was a very intense criticism of the Leavenworth curriculum.

"I do not believe that the current course adequately meets the Army's need for professionally-educated officers in. . . important skills (other than the Army in the field). The general area of skills in which the CGSC curriculum is most deficient is that of preparation for high-level staff duty."¹²

Earlier in his report, General Norris specifically addressed the problem of the gap he perceived in the preparation of Command and General Staff College graduates for high-level staff duties.

"In fulfillment of its assigned mission, CGSC concentrates primarily on the command and operational aspects of the Army in the field. The Army in the field is the 'heart' of the Army--the Army's basic reason for being--and a strong measure of concentration on its operations is essential. However, the annual production of 972 CGSC graduates who are especially expert in field operations and relatively uneducated in other areas appears to be disproportionate in view of the diversity of Army requirements."¹³

In short, General Norris felt too much emphasis was being placed on studying the Army in the field, to the detriment of those graduates who were assigned to other parts of the Army.

There was much validity in what General Norris was saying, even though his perceptions may have been colored by his previous duties as Commandant of the Armed Forces Staff College. For example, 18% of the U. S. graduates of CGSC from 1968 to 1971 were subsequently assigned to Department of Army or higher staff. An additional 10% were assigned to Combat Developments Command, CONARC HQ, STRICOM, PACOM, Southern Command, CENTAG, NORAD/ARADCOM, USA Computer System Command, Atlantic Command, Army Materiel Command, STRATCOM, and Intelligence Command. Thus, at least 28% of the Leavenworth graduates during this period were being assigned to high-level staff duty.¹⁴

In contrast, nearly 44% of the graduates from 1968 to 1971 were being assigned to Vietnam, Conus Posts, Zone of Interior Armies, Corps. and Troop Units, Panama, Alaska, Europe, and Korea.¹⁵ Obviously enough, many of these officers also became members of higher staffs, so the actual number serving with the traditional Army in the field cannot be precisely ascertained. But even though more were being assigned to the Army in the field, rather than higher staff positions, there was no startling difference between the two percentages. From General Norris' perspective, this indicated a need to further decrease "the centrality of the G3/operations functions in the Leavenworth curriculum."¹⁶ Interestingly enough, General Norris did not mention the marked decrease in operations instruction that had occurred in the twenty years since he had been an instructor at Leavenworth.

General Norris' prescription for revision was essentially a program of

"functional staff education." The Leavenworth course would be broken into two parts: the first being a "core" curriculum of four to five months covering the Army in the field, and the second being an "education coverage of staff functions" at higher Army levels during the remaining portion of the ten month course. In this second phase, students would study one of five different staff areas: personnel, intelligence, operations, logistics, and force development. A portion of this second phase would be devoted to the General Staff as a whole. General Norris stated:

"The aim should be to create expertise in a staff functional area while providing a working knowledge of how all staff agencies interact. With this balance of academic treatment between the general staff as a whole and a general staff function, we should produce professionally integrated staff officers."¹⁷

General Norris concluded his discussion of the Command and General Staff College with a ringing cry for education, rather than training:

"I consider the proper role for CGSC in the seventies is to act as a professional university for the Army. This should not be a one-course, one-curriculum university. Its principal emphasis should be on the conduct of high-caliber military education across the spectrum of professional skills required by the modern Army."¹⁸

From Leavenworth's point of view, the spirit of General Norris' Review was appreciated, but the specifics of his recommendations were difficult to accept. Many steps had been taken, especially in the electives program, to improve the curriculum and to bring education to the forefront. At the same time the College recognized that the essence of General Norris' recommendations on a "core" phase and a "functionalized" phase had been tried during the late 1940's and had been found wanting. And in the intervening period from 1950 to 1971, the scope of the curriculum had hardly decreased. By 1971, the

College's mission, according to AR 350-5, was:

"To prepare selected officers for duty as commanders and as principal staff officers with the Army in the field from division through Army group, and at field Army support command and theatre Army support command; to provide these officers with an understanding of the functions of the Army General Staff and of Major Army, joint, and combined commands; and to develop their intellectual depth and analytical ability."

Its scope was far broader than the pre-World War II curriculum, or the curriculum envisioned for the staff college after the reopening of the Army War College in 1950. Giving the College the additional responsibility of preparing each officer to "function effectively in a high-level staff area" would have tremendously increased the amount of material having to be presented during the year. The instructional material previously presented over ten months would have to be compressed into four or five months of "core" curriculum, and could only result in most of it being treated in a cursory manner, if it were treated at all. The College was simply unprepared to accept such a fundamental redirection of its mission and curriculum.

The College was also aware that the winds of change were blowing in a different direction. Beginning in the summer of 1970, the Army began a review of its philosophy and mechanics of officer career management. This review was ultimately to result in the Officer Personnel Management System (OPMS), the objectives of which were described in a June 1971 report from Department of the Army.

"The objectives of the new career management system are to provide, consistent with the needs of the service, for the optimum development and utilization of individual aptitudes, skills, interests and desires and to provide a competitive environment which gives equitable recognition to individual development and accomplishment".¹⁹

Its potential impact was immediately clear. Army officers would no longer be

required to be the complete generalist, but at the same time areas of specialization would not be limited to the traditional staff areas. If the Norris recommendations on "functionalization" were implemented, the College's future ability to respond to the new OPMS system would be severely limited.

Leavenworth had been considering a redirection of its curriculum for several years, and General Norris' recommendations on making CGSC a "Professional university for the Army" coincided with much of the sentiment for change in the College. For example, in May 1969, a special committee chaired by Colonel John M. Jennings published its conclusions on a Long Range Curriculum Study. This study recommended dividing the curriculum of the College into four separate, but closely related "disciplines": Command, Control and Staff; Tactics; Logistics and Management; and International Military Affairs. The committee also recommended dividing the curriculum into two semesters to permit "greater flexibility" in the treatment of subjects and to provide for more choice of course work by the student.²⁰ The first semester would consist of mandatory courses in the four identified "disciplines" and would develop the student's understanding of the basic principles and doctrines related to these "disciplines". The second semester would consist of a number of courses designed to further develop the student's understanding of the basic "disciplines". The student would theoretically be permitted to select from a variety of courses in order to satisfy his own "intellectual curiosity" or professional needs. The Committee concluded that these changes would "provide optimum conditions for effective learning."²¹

In the final analysis, General Norris' recommendations for changes were preempted by Leavenworth's own program for change that reached its peak about

the time the Norris Review was published. In the fall of 1971, a special ad hoc committee was appointed at CGSC to consider a new curriculum plan. This committee worked under the Deputy Commandant, Brigadier General James M. Gibson, and included Dr. Ivan J. Birrer, Colonel Harold R. Kressin, and Colonel E. D. H. Berry. While the committee was aware of General Norris' soon-to-be published ideas, its program was fundamentally different from his. The committee preferred concentration within various "majors", rather than functionalization according to staff specialties.²²

The general nature of the committee's recommendations were similar to the changes suggested in the 1969 Long Range Curriculum Study. That is, the course was divided into two semesters, with most of the common curriculum being presented in the first semester and the majority of specialties being presented in the second semester. Some of the common curriculum was also to be presented in the second semester. Dr. Ivan J. Birrer has described the purpose of the common curriculum:

"The student officer will acquire the facts, techniques and procedures which have historically been the CGSC trademark--orders, estimates, the military problem-solving sequence, staff procedures, and the fundamentals of tactics and logistics as they pertain to divisions and higher echelons."²³

The electives portion of the curriculum included both "Associate Electives" and "Professional Electives." Students were required to take two Associate Electives of 40 hours each; one was taken each semester and was usually taught by a civilian university. Students were also required to take four Professional Electives of 56 hours each. These courses, which were taught by the Leavenworth faculty, were taken during the second semester and represented an "extension" of the common curriculum. The student was offered

the opportunity of advanced study in such topics as Military Intelligence, High Level Staff, Management, Tactics, and Security Assistance. The common curriculum provided the basics on command and staff fundamentals, while the electives offered the opportunity for detailed study in a variety of areas. (In the program's first year, 53 associate and 23 professional electives were offered.) Out of a total of 1076 hours of academic subject time, the student would devote 72% of his time to common subjects and 28% to electives. The number of hours devoted to electives would increase from 90 to 304, and the electives portion of the curriculum would increase from 8% to 28%.

The Committee's recommendations were subsequently approved by the Commandant, and in December 1971 (only days after the publishing of the Norris Report) they were approved by General Ralph E. Haines, Commanding General, Continental Army Command. Thus, General Haines, as president of the Haines Board of 1966 and approver of the recommendations in 1971, provided the charter and the mandate for the changes that had swept over the Command and General Staff College. Similarly, any impact the Norris Report might have had on Leavenworth was stilled by General Haines preference for another course of action.

The need for other changes was also evident. In early 1972 the same ad hoc committee that had recommended the new curriculum was charged with the responsibility for considering a new organization for the College. Part of the impetus for this had been furnished by General Haines, who had indicated the desirability of assigning all tactical instruction to a single department. If this were to be done, and if the new curriculum plan were to be successfully

implemented, a fundamental reorganization of the College was required. To minimize turbulence, the committee recommended retaining four departments with the titles Command, Tactics, Logistics, and Strategy. This would require no changes in the Department of Command and only a name change for the Department of Joint and Combined Operations which became known as the Department of Strategy. Only slight changes were also necessary for the two other departments. The Corps and Army instructional sections of the Department of Larger Unit Operations were moved to the Department of Division Operations, which then became the Department of Tactics. The old Combat Support Section of the Department of Division Operations was not moved from the Department of Tactics to the Department of Logistics until 1974. The ad hoc committee concluded that while there were seven different courses of study being taught in 1972 that theoretically could be broken into separate departments, any further change beyond the new four departments should be approached "incrementally."²⁴

In addition to curriculum and organizational improvements, the College continued to seek better instructional methods. A long range plan for institutional development was published in October 1971, and two of the most important objectives contained in this plan concerned the improvement of constructional methods and the upgrading of the quality of the CGSC faculty. The specific goals of the plan had been repeated many times over the previous twenty-five years, illustrating the continuing nature of the problems. For example, balancing contact hours and out-of-class study requirements, improving the teacher-student ratio, providing more problem-solving activity,

and promoting the opportunity for analysis and discussion in depth had been pursued by practically every commandant since World War II. Nevertheless, during the same period when the new curriculum and organization plans were approved in 1971-1972, CGSC again began reconsidering its instructional methods.

In March 1972, Lieutenant General Garrison H. Davidson, Commandant from 1954-1956, reviewed the various proposed and approved changes concerning curriculum, organization, and methods of instruction. His conclusion was clear:

"My principal general reaction is that the proposed revision, if done properly, will represent the most significant step in the evolution of the CGSC since its inception. . . In essence, it will convert the CGSC from a vocationally oriented school to a true educational institution."²⁵

At the same time he had some important reservations. He still felt the student was overloaded and was amazed at the mass of subject matter the student was expected to learn during his ten months at CGSC. Since he could not recommend the elimination of any of the subject matter, he concluded that CGSC had to revert to a two-year course of instruction, similar to that once presented at the College.

At the same time, General Davidson suggested something previously recommended by the Williams Board in 1958. That is, with the increasingly broad nature of the Leavenworth curriculum, the "maximum appropriate instruction with respect to the division" should be placed at the branch school level. This step would preserve the "balance" of the curriculum at CGSC and insure the "preservation of the attributes which permitted our commanders and staff

officers to speak the same language and employ the same techniques during World War II that made our operations sound, yet so flexible."²⁶ Achieving this objective, according to General Davidson, should be the primary purpose of the curriculum and "all else. . . should remain secondary." While he was not arguing for a return to the "centrality of the G3/operations functions in the Leavenworth curriculum" so ardently criticized by General Norris, he did not wish to see that portion of the curriculum devoted to training or to the acquiring of a skill devoured by the trend toward intellectual development. He explained, "It seems to me the vocational portion of the core curriculum at the CGSC is the capstone of the military training program, the completion of the officer's graduate training."

There were others who perceived the need for a slight redirection of some of the instruction. For example, Lieutenant General Richard G. Stilwell, Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations, explained in an August 1972 letter to the Deputy Commandant that some military subjects needed a stronger emphasis:

"I am a strong proponent of the need--which has increased steadily over the past couple of decades--for all officers to be well informed and well equipped on international political and economic factors and trends. Unfortunately, in the process of providing requisite coverage in this area, our senior school system has tended to slight the military side. . . I appreciate the problem of competing demands for course hours, but I feel that it is essential that students be well informed on military issues. It strikes me as somewhat ironic that a detailed study of Military Strategy is offered as an elective rather than being a core subject."²⁷

At Leavenworth there was some uneasiness among some because of the decrease in the amount of tactical instruction. One only has to refer to Table 1 to realize that while other subjects such as staff fundamentals and special

weapons employment were affected by the changing nature of the Leavenworth, a good percentage of the extra hours came at the expense of tactics instruction.

But by 1973, Leavenworth was implicitly a different institution than it had been in 1966, or in 1946. The idea of the complete generalist,, especially trained in division operations, had begun to fade in the early 1960's. By 1973 the Leavenworth graduate was considered a generalist, but at the same time he had received nearly 30% of his instruction in an area that was essentially a secondary specialty. He still had a sound operations background, but the depth of his exposure was much less than that of the graduates of the 1950's and early 1960's unless his electives had been taken in the area of tactical operations. In that case, the Leavenworth graduate might have had a sounder understanding than any of his predecessors.

The addition of the electives program was, in many ways, the most forward-thinking step taken by the College in decades. For the first time, part of the curriculum could be devoted to fulfilling the needs of the individual student. Some of the curriculum which previously had been of little interest to much of student body was delegated to its proper position within the electives program. For many students, this meant the instruction became more relevant to their own needs, and within the electives the level of sophistication could be higher than it previously had been when the disinterested had been included in the class. As a result of the electives program, the Leavenworth student probably learned more about his profession and his own specialty than previously had been possible.

The long-term result of the Haines Board was thus far more than simply adding "greater flexibility" to the CGSC curriculum. The basic nature of the curriculum was affected, and the fundamental qualifications of the Leavenworth graduate were changed. Surprisingly enough, there were few who doubted the wisdom of these changes. There was some apprehension about having moved too far away from the operations functions of the general staff officer, and there were others who sought a redirection of some of the electives. But practically no one suggested a return to the pre-1966 system. The College was justifiably proud of the progress it had made in the previous decade.

ENDNOTES

CHAPTER TWO

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⁷Colonel John D. Sapp (Secretary, CGSC), Letter to CG, US Continental Army Command, Comments on Haines Board Report, 4 April 1966, (N-18599.8-E-2) Inclosure 1.

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¹⁸Ibid., p. 6-11.

¹⁹Major General Verne L. Bowers (The Adjutant General), "The Officer Personnel Management System, 25 June 1971," p. C-1-1.

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²²Brigadier General J. M. Gibson, "Report of Ad Hoc Committee for Review of CGSC Organization," Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 26 May 1972.

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²⁴Gibson, "Report of Ad Hoc Committee," 26 May 1972.

²⁵Lieutenant General Garrison H. Davidson to General Ralph E. Haines (CG, CONARC), 22 March 1972.

²⁶Ibid.

²⁷Lieutenant General Richard G. Stilwell (DCS for Military Operations) to Brigadier General J. M. Gibson (Deputy Commandant, CGSC), 30 August 1972.

Chapter 3

The Environment for Change, 1973

By late 1972 the environment was favorable for further change at the Command and General Staff College. As previously explained, Leavenworth was a different institution by 1972-1973 than it had been in the immediate post-World War II years. The College had progressed in its attempts to satisfy the individual needs of the student, had improved its basic methods of instruction, and had molded and enriched its curriculum to reflect the changing nature of warfare and the ever-broadening role of the Army officer. By accretion and evolution, the College had moved from a curriculum dominated by division operations in the 1950's, to a curriculum designed to produce officers prepared for the management and utilization of military resources across a broad spectrum of roles. The changing environment of 1972-1973, however, altered many of the assumptions and operating parameters of the previous decade. The era of change that had begun in 1966 was to rapidly accelerate during the period 1973-1976.

The impetus for change originated in the converging of a number of factors that were to modify much of the material presented at the College and also to redirect its fundamental mission. Among the factors inducing change were the reorganization of the Army Schooling system under Operation STEADFAST and the implementation of the Officer Personnel Management System (OPMS). These furnished the basis for a reexamination of the role of CGSC. At the same time the content of the curriculum was remarkably affected by the announcement of the Echelons Above Division program, the

ending of the American role in South Viet Nam, the concurrent turning of the Army's attention to those areas not directly involved with internal defense and development, and the detailed study of the soon-to-be revealed revelations of the October 1973 Middle East War. One important factor affecting all others was the transition to a professional Army. The combining of these created an environment in 1973 within which the new Commandant, Major General John H. Cushman, and new Deputy Commandant, Brigadier General Benjamin L. Harrison, worked to redirect and reinvigorate the efforts of the College.

One of the most important elements in the creation of an environment for change in 1973 was the formal establishment of the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) on July 1, 1973. As part of this reorganization, which was known as Operation STEADFAST, the Combined Arms Center was established at Fort Leavenworth, with two of its subordinate elements being the Command and General Staff College and the Combined Arms Combat Development Agency (CACDA). The Combined Arms Center was one of the three functional centers under TRADOC and was expected to play a strong role in the execution of combat development programs. No analysis of Operation STEADFAST would be complete without mentioning the important role of General William E. DePuy, Commanding General, TRADOC. As the first commander of the Training and Doctrine Command, General DePuy took a personal interest in the Combined Arms Center, and his interests and desires played an important role in the future direction of the College. His demand for excellence, his great confidence in his own ideas, and his authorship of the "new tactics" were to influence profoundly the basic thrust and curriculum of Leavenworth.

In 1973 the Command and General Staff College had not been deeply involved in the writing of doctrine for more than a decade, but Operation STEADFAST assigned the College responsibility for the writing and reviewing of doctrinal literature. Under the reorganization CGSC was expected "to participate in the development of concepts and doctrine for the operation of Army forces from division through Army group."¹ Prior to 1962 the College had participated in the writing of doctrine, since the U. S. Army believed that the development of doctrine and training literature could not be separated from the presentation of instruction. According to contemporary thought, the agency charged with preparation and presentation of instruction on a military subject should also be responsible for the development of doctrine related to that subject. The creation of the U. S. Army Combat Developments Command in 1962, however, completely altered this philosophy. The preparation of doctrine and training literature was divorced from U. S. Army Schools, which would be responsible only for reviewing new doctrine and basing their instruction upon the doctrine and training literature provided by the Combat Developments Command.

Operation STEADFAST caused a return to the pre-1962 system of having the schools directly participate in the formulation of doctrine. As for Fort Leavenworth, the study upon which Operation STEADFAST was based concluded:

"A constant informal interchange of ideas between the CGSC author/instructor and the CACDA project officer is vital to both the education and the combat development process."²

As the focal point for the development of combined arms concepts and with combat developments and educational elements subordinate to it, the Combined

Arms Center could ensure a unity of effort between the needs of the combined arms community and the efforts of the combat development process. The Command and General Staff College would write the field manuals pertaining to the employment of the combined arms, while the Combat Developments Agency would provide the studies upon which the field manuals and the new doctrine would be based. And the students' curiosity, willingness to criticize, and recent field experience would provide a readily available testing ground for many of the new ideas. The new organization of the Combined Arms Center thus provided for the ready exchange of ideas between the researcher, the instructor, and the student.

The writing of doctrine subsequently consumed an ever-greater portion of the College's time and effort. Before the implementation of Operation STEADFAST, the College had prepared three training literature items (FM 105-5, ATP 20-5, and DA Pam 600-15). By the end of 1973, the College was preparing 24 field manuals, one ATP, and two training circulars. By January 1976, the College was preparing 20 field manuals, one ATP, seven training circulars, and two TRADOC bulletins. The actual task was much larger, however, since these figures do not reflect the large number of manuals which the Command and General Staff College reviewed from other schools and agencies. In any case, classroom instruction at CGSC had the opportunity to include the latest methods, concepts, and doctrine.

Another change affecting the content of the curriculum was the Echelons Above Division Study (EAD). During the period 1969 to 1973 the Combat Developments Command studied the feasibility of reducing the number of command echelons above the division. With additional responsiveness and flexibility

being provided by improved communications and with the division being a more powerful and relatively self-contained force, the study group concluded that the echelons supporting the division should be as few as possible. Thus, the study recommended the field army be eliminated as a normal command echelon above the corps. The next echelon above the division would be the corps, which would have both tactical and support functions.

The Echelons Above Division Study was approved by the Chief of Staff, General Creighton W. Abrams, Jr., in May 1973. When he approved the study, General Abrams expressed concern that the Leavenworth student might mistakenly get the impression "that an instructional 'type' corps, complete with a full complement of all conceivable support elements, is the 'normal' organization found in the field." To avoid this possibility, he emphasized that service school instruction should concentrate on "the principle by which a force is organized, to include mission, enemy, terrain and other constraints such as availability of forces."³ On July 20, 1973, the Commander of TRADOC directed that the new doctrine be taught in Army schools.

At Leavenworth, the major effect of the Echelons Above Division decision concerned curriculum content. While the effects on the curriculum were not dramatic, much of the tactics and logistics instruction had to be adjusted to reflect the absence of the field army as a normal command echelon above the corps. The College also embarked on the writing of a new manual, FM 100-15, Larger Unit Operations, prescribing doctrine for the organization, deployment, and employment of corps and higher Army echelons.

The year 1973 was also the time of a fundamental redirection of the U. S. Army. One major part of this change was the establishing of the Modern Volunteer Army, since the transition to a professional Army overturned many traditional precepts. For example, with the ending of the draft, the importance of the reserves greatly increased. In the same period, the participation of American forces in the war in Viet Nam ended, and the Army turned its attention to many questions it had neglected during the previous decade. The intellectual thought, materiel and personnel resources, and development processes, which had been devoted to South East Asia, turned to focus on different areas, Europe and the Middle East. In that sense, the October 1973 war in the Middle East was an opportune occurrence. The conflicting parties in the war represented relatively sophisticated and technical societies, employing modern weaponry in a mid-intensity environment. The startling violence and consuming nature of that war served to accelerate the transition from the previous preoccupation with insurgency, to the new concern with conventional warfare. Few doubted that a concerted effort was necessary if the U. S. Army were to be prepared for such a war.

The October War was revealing in several aspects. First, modern weaponry demonstrated itself to be immensely more lethal than in the past. The unexpected level of violence convinced many observers that future wars would be remarkably more violent and lethal than those of the past, and that the successful outcome of the war would depend on the results of the first crucial and violent battles. Additionally, training of the individual was recognized as the key to success on this lethal battlefield.

With every soldier and officer knowing his duties in detail, enemy weaknesses could be exploited, and friendly capabilities could be utilized to the maximum. Proper training could also enable the individual to reduce his vulnerability. At the same time, the combined arms team increased in importance, for one of the important lessons of the Mideast War had been that no single branch could succeed in battle without the combined support of infantry, armor, artillery, engineer, or air support. The cohesive combined arms team was the most lethal instrument on the battlefield.

In short, with the appearance of a battle field of unparalleled lethality and violence, with the absolute necessity to employ the complex combined arms team, and with the crucial requirement for readiness and training, the American Army faced what it considered a completely new situation. A succinct description of the new situation was included in the new FM 100-5 draft, Operations:

"The first battle of our next war could well be its last battle: belligerents could be quickly exhausted, and international pressures to stop fighting could bring about an early cessation of hostilities. The United States could find itself in a short, intense war--the outcome of which may be dictated by the results of initial combat. This circumstance is unprecedented: we are an Army historically unprepared for its first battle. We are accustomed to victory wrought with the weight of materiel and population brought to bear after the onset of hostilities. Today the US Army must, above all else, prepare to win the first battle of the next war. Once the war is upon us, we shall aim at emerging triumphant from the final battles as well."⁴

The threat of the "come-as-you-are" war thus modified many of the previous assumptions of the Army schooling system. The Army leadership no longer felt that the luxury of preparation time would be permitted in the next war.

Within the Army schooling system, one of the most important instruments of change came to be the new Officer Personnel Management System (OPMS). The CGSC curriculum in 1973 seemed to closely coincide with the spirit of the OPMS changes. That is, the availability of electives permitted the student to concentrate his efforts on improving his primary or secondary specialty. As discussed in the previous chapter, recognition of the basic thrust of OPMS had been an important consideration behind constructing and broadening the electives program. Leavenworth believed that all Army officers could no longer be considered to be on the same path to career success. Rather, officers would have varied backgrounds and needs, and the Leavenworth curriculum reflected this diversity. Over the next several years, however, it became apparent that OPMS required fundamental modifications or actions by CGSC.

The clearest evidence of the long-range effect of OPMS can be seen in the TRADOC OPMS Task Group study. Though this report was published in March 1975, its basic ideas were in existence in 1973. This Task Group concluded that the officer education system should be marked by:

"Focus on fundamental skills to the exclusion of 'nice to know' material in the limited resident training time available.

"Use of resident training to prepare officers specifically for their next immediate assignment.

"Greater emphasis on providing training programs to the field in order to support the individual developmental training of officers, and to assist officers in the collective training of their units in the tactics and techniques essential to combat effectiveness."⁵

While each of these characteristics were important to Leavenworth, the second one had the most immediate affect. The Task Group succinctly

described the impact of this new development:

"Since the 1920's, the education system has aimed at training officers for performance at two grade levels higher than their own. The old concept was that in mobilization there would be a cushion of time to prepare for battle, and the officer corps would be a cadre for expansion. It grew out of the experience of World War I, and was confirmed by the experience of World War II. Now, however, there can be no expectation of a cushion of time."⁶

The TRADOC OPMS Task Group added:

"In the past, the battle captain actually has been handicapped by the requirements for a broad education. If he is to be successful in the first battle of the next war, he must be able to do precisely one job. He must be able to fight. Under OPMS, he will be trained for that job."⁷

Needless to say, such a view only five years earlier would have been anathema, but TRADOC was to effectively use OPMS as a vehicle for preparing for the intense, violent war it foresaw in the future.

In July 1973, the College mission was not much different from what it had been for the previous two-and-a-half decades. That is, the College conducted the resident course to prepare its students for duty as commanders and as principal staff officers with the Army in the field from division through Army group, and at comparable levels in the Army's combat service support units. By virtue of this mission, the emphasis at CGSC was undoubtedly on division and higher and on providing the basis for the student's long-term development. Hardly anyone at Leavenworth envisioned movement away from the centrality of the division and from the concern for long-term development.

On July 20, 1973, the Command and General Staff College received word of an important future change. On that date, General William E. DePuy called the Commandant of CGSC, Major General John J. Hennessey, to discuss lowering the center of gravity of instruction at Leavenworth. General

DePuy pointed out that with the distinct possibility of a smaller Army in the future, better quality was necessary. This meant that better platoon leaders, better company commanders, better battalion commanders, etc., were essential. The Commander of TRADOC also indicated that he believed the center of gravity of Leavenworth instruction should be at division, with about 50% of the instruction presented at division level, 25% at corps level (taking into consideration the recent doctrinal changes on Echelons Above Division), and 25% at brigade level. He then asked for comments from the Commandant on the implications of these changes for Leavenworth.⁸

A staff study was conducted at the College on the impact of the proposed changes. Among the findings was the recognition that 2.4% of the total instruction in the common curriculum for which an organizational level could be determined concerned the brigade, 54.8% concerned the division, and 42.8% concerned a level above division.⁹ The center of gravity was thus somewhat above division level, with very little emphasis being placed on instruction below division. The Director of the Department of Tactics noted this center of gravity and explained, "Considering what we teach in joint operations, strategy, theater army, DA and DOD, I suspect our overall center of gravity is appreciably higher."¹⁰

The staff study on the center of gravity also offered a concise statement of the "philosophical basis for instruction at the CGSC"

"Military education is defined in AR 351-1 as the systematic instruction of individuals in subjects which will enhance their knowledge of the science and the art of war. Military training is the instruction of personnel to enhance their capacity to perform specific military functions and tasks.

Education implies the understanding of broad principles. Training on the other hand involves specific job related functions. Since the College is engaged in military education not training, it should be concerned primarily with the long term and not be limited to the functions of the student's next assignment. Concern for instruction for the short term would better be left to the electives program. The common curriculum should stress the longer term since it represents the required knowledge for a large group of career officers who will not attend further military colleges. The teaching of underlying principles and the need for a body of knowledge for the long term argue against preoccupation with organizational levels in those subjects that do not naturally lend themselves to such levels."¹¹

The staff study correctly suggested that one of the possible purposes for the proposed lowering of the center of gravity was "to provide instruction suitable for likely assignments of CGSC graduates immediately or soon after graduation."¹²

The reaction of the directors of the four academic departments to the possibility of lowering the center of gravity was varied. The Department of Command recommended no change, and the Department of Logistics agreed. As a result of the Echelons Above Division decision, the Department of Logistics had already rewritten and lowered the center of gravity of much of its instruction. To lower the center even further would require developing and rewriting more than 40% of the logistics curriculum. The Department of Strategy responded in a more philosophical vein. The Department Director argued:

"We should be teaching principles; principles which would be valid at any echelon. If we are an educational college as opposed to a training school, the nuts and bolts should be incidental to the methodology and the principles involved."¹³

Nevertheless, the Director of the Department of Strategy argued that the center of gravity for the branch schools should be lowered, while that for

CGSC should put the "greatest emphasis" on the division. Only the Department of Tactics supported broadening the scope of instruction. The Department Director stated, "I am elated that this subject is being looked into." He explained, "It is doubtful if the full value of developing or executing a tactical plan for a division can be realized if the student is not then required to take that plan and develop implementing plans at least one level lower."¹⁴ Tactics instruction at the brigade level would permit the student to test and apply higher level plans that had already been developed.

But none of the department directors supported or envisioned a dramatic lowering of the center of gravity. Even though the Department of Tactics apparently welcomed some lowering, it foresaw only slight changes in its curriculum lessons in order to accomplish the desired objectives. Major General Hennessey supported this viewpoint in his reply to General DePuy. He recommended, "A reasonable ratio of hours for the College appears to be 10 percent below division, 55 percent at division, and 35 percent above division."¹⁵

As a result of these several factors (the changing nature of warfare, the implementation of Operation STEADFAST, the entrance of CGSC into the doctrinal arena, the modification of the Army structure by virtue of the Echelons Above Division decision, the redirection of officer education resulting from OPMS, and the effort to lower the center of gravity for instruction at the College) a new environment for change was created at Fort Leavenworth. Much of the curriculum, especially in tactics and logistics, had to be redone, and practically all the doctrine had to be rewritten. At the same time the Army and Leavenworth's thinking had to be

reoriented toward what were considered "unprecedented" circumstances.

With the exception of the revelations of the October War and a clear understanding of the effect of OPMS, this was the environment when Major General John H. Cushman and Brigadier Benjamin L. Harrison arrived at Fort Leavenworth. Amidst these driving forces for change, General Cushman brought a number of concepts that were to influence CGSC thinking over the next two-and-a-half years. The first, and perhaps most important, concerned the nature of warfare. To emphasize his perception of war, General Cushman often quoted General George C. Marshall's Infantry in Battle:

"The Art of War has no traffic with rules, for the infinitely varied circumstances and conditions of combat never produce exactly the same situation twice. Mission, terrain, weather, dispositions, armament, morale, supply, and comparative strength are variables whose mutations always combine to form a new tactical pattern. Thus in battle, each situation is unique and must be solved on its own merits. . .

"The leader who frantically strives to remember what someone else did in some slightly similar situation has already set his feet on a well-traveled road to ruin."¹⁶

This idea of the fickle variability of warfare remained an integral part of General Cushman's philosophy and influenced many of the changes he subsequently made at the College. This perception was also included in the College's draft edition of FM 100-5, Operations of Army Forces in the Field. Included within that draft manual was the statement:

"Tactics has certain principles which can be learned, but it has no traffic with rules. It is better that a tactician be able to go to the essentials of a single situation and solve it well than that he memorize all the rules ever written. The master tactical leader never stops thinking and learning, even in combat."¹⁷

This shortened version of Marshall's view of war became the guiding light of the Cushman reforms.

Another important perception of General Cushman concerned the nature of Leavenworth itself. That is, he felt that CGSC was overly concerned with "jargon, acronyms, rules tactical forms, prescribed methods, check lists, and over-elaborate and pretentious definitions."¹⁸ He promptly labelled this tendency "scholasticism," a term derived from Forrest C. Pogue's description of the thinking General Marshall had discovered at Fort Benning, when he had first been appointed Commandant of that important military school.¹⁹ General Cushman explained, "Scholasticism is essentially pedantry. It is the construction of a framework, a dogma, or a teaching that is artificial and yet has a completeness about it. . . ." ²⁰

The changes General Cushman made at Leavenworth were designed to "expunge" this scholasticism. In December 1974, he said:

"How do we destroy pedantry, yet still teach tactics? Simple. By realism. Pedantry disappears when the bullets are flying. We have to get the reality of the battlefield into the classroom, and we have to teach our students how to get it into the training exercises when they leave here. At Leavenworth in our instruction we try to do this by writing realistic problems in which the units may have fictitious numbers, but they are in true-to-life situations. We try to do it by case analysis of good historical examples, by shifting from large classes to the small work group, each with a faculty discussion leader, in which the student has four times as much chance to get involved. And we try to do it by making the student participate, and think, and consider cause and effect by practical, realistic application on the ground."²¹

This emphasis on realism was enunciated within the first month of General Cushman's arrival at Leavenworth. In September 1973, he told a meeting of key College faculty members:

"Our instruction must be real, and deal with real matters and real issues. The student must sense from the very first day that the College is operating in an environment of reality. The manner in which every subject is approached must

relate to the real world and must be relevant and meaningful in its own right. A theory or a doctrine we can put out, but those theories or doctrine should be perceived by the student as being derived from observations of reality and from practical and actual experiences, and applicable to the real world. I do not object to our problems using fictitious divisions, but all our instruction must deal with real-type situations."²²

The pursuit of realism thus emphasized true-to-life situations, use of historical examples, application of the case study method, moving to small work groups, and student participation. The method was essentially one of education, rather than training, or rote memorization. Broad principles would be emphasized, not laundry lists of information. Many fundamentals previously taught in the classroom would supposedly be learned through reading assignments in homework. The student would no longer be a passive learner coming to the classroom to be fed information. He was now expected to learn many of the fundamentals on his own and to demonstrate his newly acquired understanding in the classroom.

General Cushman thus sought to make the student work harder than he had in the past. In September 1975, the Commandant explained:

"When I got here, I decided that it ought to be harder work than it was, and that the aiming point for instruction should be about one-third point down from the top, and not two-thirds down from the top, and that we should not teach anything in the classroom that he has to study. That was not being done. There was an awful lot of repetition right here in the classroom of what he was supposed to have studied."²³

Every effort would be made to place the onus of learning on the student.

The year 1973 was thus the beginning of a new phase of change, though the several forces behind this change had not been identified clearly enough to project the major direction of the change. But one thing was clear. Leavenworth was about to be swept up in a whirlwind of change.

ENDNOTES

CHAPTER THREE

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⁴Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual No. 100-5 (Draft), Operations (Washington, D. C., 15 December 1975), p. 1-2.

⁵U. S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, "Education and Training of Officers Under the Officer Personnel Management System," 14 March 1975, Vol. II, pp. II-1, II-2.

⁶Ibid., p. II-2

⁷Ibid., p. II-3.

⁸Major General John J. Hennessey (Commandant, CGSC), Memorandum for Record, Telephone Call from CG TRADOC, 20 July 1973.

⁹Colonel P. B. Welch (Acting Director of Resident Instruction), Information Paper to Commandant, Telephone Call from CG TRADOC, 27 July 1973, Tab B.

¹⁰Colonel John D. White (Director, Department of Tactics), Memorandum for Acting Director of Resident Instruction, Center of Gravity for CGSC Instruction, 25 July 1973.

¹¹Welch, Information Paper to Commandant, Tab C.

¹²Ibid., Tab D.

¹³Colonel Marshall Sanger (Director, Department of Strategy), Memorandum to Director of Resident Instruction, Center of Gravity, CGSC Instruction, 26 July 1973.

¹⁴White, Memorandum for Acting Director of Resident Instruction, 25 July 1973.

¹⁵Major General John J. Hennessey (Commandant, CGSC), Letter to General William E. DePuy (Commander, TRADOC), 9 August 1973.

¹⁶Colonel George C. Marshall, et al., Infantry in Battle (Washington D. C., 1939), p. 1.

¹⁷Quoted by Major General John H. Cushman in TV presentation on FM 100-5, 9 December 1975.

¹⁸Ibid.

¹⁹Forrest C. Pogue, George C. Marshall: Education of a General (New York: The Viking Press, 1963), p. 251.

²⁰Private interview conducted with Major General John H. Cushman, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 7 February 1976.

²¹Major General Cushman in TV presentation on FM 100-5, 9 December 1975.

²²Major General Cushman's remarks on 12 September 1973 are included in Brigadier General B. L. Harrison (Deputy Commandant, CGSC), Memorandum for Staff and Faculty, /5 Curriculum Planning as Viewed by the Commandant, 26 September 1973.

²³Major General Cushman's remarks are included in Verbatim Transcript of CGSC Briefing for the Brehm Committee, 30 September 1975.

Chapter 4

Getting Realism Into The Classroom

When Major General Cushman became Commandant, one of his first duties in August 1973 was to make a welcoming address to the new regular course of Academic Year 1973-1974. During that lecture he discussed the problem of getting the Army to adapt or to make progressive changes. To explain his point, General Cushman used the analogy of moving from point "A" to point "B". He explained that the Army could not "drift" and had to have an "orderly conception" of where it was--point "A"--and where it wanted to go--point "B".¹ A few days before he left Fort Leavenworth as Commandant in February 1976, General Cushman had that analogy in mind when he talked about the Command and General Staff College:

"I didn't know how to get from A to B. I told them that. . .It is a mysterious kind of process to make this institution move. . ."2

He believed in 1973 he knew where the College was and where the College should go, but he recognized getting CGSC to the final desired position would require movement along an often imperceptible path. And as he got into the process, the magnitude of the problem of moving the College from "A" to "B" became even more vivid. In February 1976, he explained:

"It is not easy to make a big institution move. . .It is kind of like putting a bunch of wildcats in a great big mattress cover on a hillside and then the wildcats will fight and the mattress cover will generally roll down the hill. . .You just don't say to this college, 'College, attention! Right face! Forward March!' It just doesn't go that way. In the first place getting their attention is hard. . ."3

But from the instructor's point of view General Cushman's arrival was like the unleashing of a blitzkrieg.

The faculty was aware within the first few weeks of General Cushman's arrival that a major change was in the making. A summary of the new Commandant's remarks on September 12, 1973, to key College faculty concerning his views on the curriculum was provided to the staff and faculty in late September. That summary served as an early warning of the scope of the changes that would later affect the curriculum, for everything from computers, to staff operations, to the characteristics of ground combat, to the U. S. strategic situation was addressed. Over the next several months rumors flourished, as General Cushman explored numerous alternatives for improving the College. Some of these alternatives were acidly received by the faculty. For example, one initial concept for the curriculum was severely criticized by a committee chief in the Department of Tactics:

"The proposed curriculum contains the right subjects but constitute, in my mind, an introduction to tactics."⁴

The committee chief argued that a number of important tactical lessons had been deleted in previous years and that the new curriculum was simply a continuation of that process. Other suggestions from the new Commandant received the same sort of reception, with the faculty succeeding in convincing him not to attempt some of his projects. An example of this is General Cushman's initial desire to vastly increase the study and application of computers in the curriculum. The faculty was able to convince him that such a change would have taken an inordinate amount of time from other essential subjects.

On December 12, 1973, Brigadier General Harrison communicated basic guidance which was to be applied, if possible, during the current year,

and which was to be applied extensively in the planning for the 1974-1975 Academic Year. This guidance concerned increased use of the case study method and small work groups; an emphasis on learning that was to be more "real" and more "lasting;" the reduction of contact hours; the reduction in printed issue material; emphasis on "messages, frag orders, and informal coordination vis-a-vis detailed written complete operation orders with annexes and appendices;" the ending of "exam week" and the College's formal review of examinations; and the increased monitoring of instruction by officers in the grade of Colonel.⁵ But many members of the faculty still misunderstood what General Cushman was seeking, and the new Commandant had not yet determined the exact course he wished to follow in moving the College from "A" to "B".

During these first few months, there was undoubtedly confusion and apprehension among the faculty concerning the new direction of the College. Part of this was due to faulty communication between the new Commandant and the faculty. The clearest example of this is the misunderstanding of the term "scholasticism." Unfortunately, some key faculty members initially thought this meant General Cushman did not want any "deep thinkers" or "scholars". This misunderstanding was perhaps increased by General Cushman's use of another quote from General George C. Marshall:

"I insist we must get down to the essentials, make clear the real difficulties, and expunge the bunk, complications, and ponderosities; we must concentrate on registering in men's minds certain vital considerations instead of a mass of less important details."⁶

Some mistakenly thought this implied a pursuit of more narrow and specific rules of combat, and by the time the information filtered down to the

instructor, the result was often change neither desired nor approved by the Commandant. Though the problem was eventually ameliorated, the instructor found himself in a difficult situation of not knowing which direction to go. Rather than expressing his program in specific bureaucratic objectives, General Cushman enunciated philosophical objectives, but within the bureaucracy of CGSC, the absence of clear bureaucratic objectives created a number of differing perceptions of what the new Commandant wanted. Leavenworth had been preoccupied with elaborate rules, methods, and definitions for too long to suddenly abandon them.

Despite the numerous rumors among, and false starts by the faculty, there were relatively few changes in the curriculum during General Cushman's first year. Since the curriculum for each academic year is planned and written a year in advance, a major change in direction is almost physically impossible after the academic year begins. Consequently, changes during the first year were only a sampling of what would occur in the following year. The initial changes included, for example, increased usage of the small work groups, a decrease in printed material handed out in the classroom, and an increased emphasis on Soviet tactics. A number of electives were also added for the second and third term. But there was no major re-direction of the curriculum. The major changes were made in Academic Year 1974-1975, and planning and rewriting of this curriculum began in earnest in early January 1974. While all departments were affected, many of the most important

changes concentrated on the Department of Tactics. The thrust of General Cushman's ideas, thus, can perhaps best be understood by looking at the changes that were planned in tactics instruction in early 1974 and implemented in Academic Year 1974-1975.

Several study groups were established to consider possible changes in tactics instruction, and the major direction of their effort was given by General Cushman. There was to be an introductory block of lessons emphasizing the nature and characteristics of the battlefield. A second block of lessons would provide a fully developed study of a "light" corps in a contingency situation in the Middle East, and a third block would concentrate on a deployed corps in a North Atlantic Treaty Organization setting in western Europe. The first block would reacquaint the officer with basic branch considerations and provide a background for further instruction for those (such as chaplains, dentists, and lawyers) who had no well-developed vocabulary or concept base for learning tactics. The second and third blocks would examine the various aspects of planning from the corps to the brigade and would provide the students the opportunity to "fight" the subordinate elements of the corps as they executed the plans that had been studied and prepared during the preceding phase of the lesson.

The study groups began work in January 1974 developing the classes for these blocks of instruction. The beginning work on the introductory block on the characteristics of the battlefield was done by students working on a special study project. Their basic concepts were then developed by officers within the Department of Tactics. The final

configuration of the initial block of instruction emphasized establishing a basic understanding of the nature of combat. The student was expected to learn weapon ranges, combat fundamentals, and unit organizations, capabilities, and limitations, but he was not expected to memorize "laundry lists" or rules that could be applied to every tactical situation. General Cushman believed the battlefield was too dynamic for the College to furnish the student with a template for every possible tactical situation. Learning Soviet tactics was an essential portion of this instruction. By forcing the student to study the psychological makeup of the Soviet soldier, to know the organization and equipment of Soviet units, and to understand the basic features of Soviet offensive and defensive tactics, the classroom theoretically left the abstract world of academia and entered the "real" world of the soldier.

Another essential part of the introductory block was a detailed study of the Battle of Schmidt in World War II and the October 1973 Middle East War. These periods emphasized the dynamics of the battlefield and discussed every unit from platoon to corps. The study of the two combat examples was intended to create a sense of realism in the classroom and to illustrate the complexities of the battlefield. The fear, the confusion, the unknown, and the disorder of the battlefield could not be duplicated in the classroom, but the student could gain a sense or a flavor of these conflicting factors through an exposure to these historical examples. The study of the October War was also used to create a sense of urgency in the student. The College sought to emphasize the lessons of their war, especially the increased lethality and violence. In most cases, these vivid combat examples effectively abolished the Viet Nam "syndrome" or preoccupation from which many students still suffered.

The instructional lessons on the Middle East and European scenarios were developed by a group of officers from the tactics department, but required a combined effort from the Departments of Strategy, Logistics, and Tactics. The scenarios were not to be developed in a vacuum by one department but were to include the realistic considerations of strategic deployment and logistics. Tactics was no longer to be artificially separated from logistics and personnel considerations. This integration of several aspects of military planning provided an important part of the realism General Cushman was seeking, since the basic idea was to make the scenarios as "real" as possible, with forces used being similar to those in existence and with problems being similar to those in the "real" world. The American forces would no longer be fighting with 100% personnel and equipment; they would be fighting in an austere environment and would usually be outnumbered by the enemy. Similarly, the extended fronts they defended would resemble "real" world frontages, and not the unrealistic frontages often envisioned in manuals.

Simulation was an important part of the tactics instruction, for the College was attempting to go beyond the traditional emphasis on staff operations and procedures. In that sense, war games provided a disciplined way of examining a plan put into execution, and a war game or map maneuver was conducted in each of the tactics blocks of instruction. Each war game was designed to illustrate the major teaching points of the lesson block, to permit the application of principles learned in previous instruction, and to stimulate student interest. For example, the introductory block had a small war game on a terrain board to illustrate the lethality of the new weapon systems. The European block concluded with a map maneuver of

an American armored division opposing an enemy combined arms army. The war games also provided a realistic setting for practicing the task of problem-solving. As a member of a staff, the student was expected to take the information given him, analyze the situation, and produce workable alternatives. This provided the environment for emphasizing staff coordination and planning. In the execution phase of the war game, the student staff applied the plan it had developed and saw how effective its plan worked against an enemy force. By application in the classroom, the students learned the consequences of their good or bad decision.

An inherent part of the changes made in tactics instruction revolved around lowering the center of gravity. There was a quantum increase in the amount of instruction on units below the division. By Academic Year 1975-1976, content of Department of Tactics instruction had changed as follows:

<u>1973-1974⁷</u>			<u>1975-1976⁸</u>		
<u>Level</u>	<u>Hours</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Level</u>	<u>Hours</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Below Division	15.5	8.6%	Below Division	44.8	31.5
			Company	(5.9)	(4.1)
			Battalion	(10.7)	(7.5)
			Brigade	(28.2)	(19.9)
At Division	113.6	63.1%	At Division	39.7	28.0
Above Division	51.0	28.3%	Corps	57.4	40.5
	<u>180.1</u>	<u>100.0%</u>		<u>141.9</u>	<u>100.0%</u>

The first period in tactics, which is not reflected in the totals for 1975-1976, also included a discussion of the platoon in various combat units. While the objective of lowering the center of gravity also affected the other academic departments, none were affected as dramatically as the Department of Tactics.

Some members of the Tactics Department disliked an emphasis on the platoon, company, battalion, or brigade. They insisted that the College

was like the Missouri River. It had once been an inch wide and a mile deep, but now it was an inch deep and a mile wide. Nevertheless, most soon recognized the potential of instruction on the lower echelons. A fact sheet in April 1974 from the Director, Department of Tactics, to the Commandant, succinctly described the reasoning underlying the consideration of battalion and brigade in tactics instruction.

"Inherent in the approach to teaching tactics at Leavenworth has been the need to visualize operations at a lower level when acting as commander or senior staff member at corps or division. We have said that the corps commander visualizes the operations of brigades when he 'war games' down to the battalion level. We expect the corps staff to plot brigade locations on the corps situation map and division situation maps to show battalions. This reflects the fact that the corps and division are not monoliths but are entities composed of many sub-elements. One way to teach the whole is to teach its parts, and this in effect has been characteristic of tactics instruction in the past as well as of future tactics instruction. This is particularly true of the division where the combat power resides at the battalion level and is manipulated by the division commander through the brigade level command and control headquarters."

The idea of teaching the whole by teaching its parts became an important ingredient in adding and achieving realism in the classroom. If the student "thought" battalion and brigade, he could more effectively understand the maneuver and control of the division and corps.

General Cushman closely monitored every aspect of the new tactics instruction to ensure that it did not stray from his desired objective. In some instances instructor difficulties were compounded by the Commandant's uncertainty about what he sought. One instructor colorfully described the problem:

"General Cushman was like the Supreme Court Justice who said, 'I can't give you a definition of obscenity, but I can recognize obscenity when I see it.' Well, General Cushman couldn't give you a precise definition of good instruction, but he knew good instruction when he saw it."

This uncertainty often led to last minute changes. A clear example of such changes occurred during the initial part of Academic Year 1974-1975 in a class presented on the role of the infantry on the modern battlefield. As part of the introductory block of tactics instruction, the initial concept for the class had been developed in the previous year by a group of students working on a special study project, but the content of the class evolved as the Commandant and the faculty made several changes. Being infantry, General Cushman wanted to make certain the class was an excellent presentation, so he took a personal interest in the content and in the excellence of the presentation.

On the day the class was first presented, it was given once in the morning and once in the afternoon. The initial portion of the class was given in Eisenhower Auditorium, and the latter portion--primarily a discussion in small work groups--took place in the section rooms. When General Cushman saw the first presentation in the morning, he immediately directed several changes in the Eisenhower Auditorium portion of the instruction. When the section room portion was completed at noon, General Cushman immediately assembled all the instructors in one of the classrooms and told them how the material presented in the auditorium and in the section room would be changed. At that time he also handed the instructors another student issue that had just arrived from a hasty printing at the printing plant. By the time the presentation was again given in the afternoon, a very different class was presented to the second group.

Amidst this dynamic environment of frequent change, the instructors often felt frustrated and did not understand the basic thrust of what was

happening. In previous years, lesson plans had been the result of years of development, days of rehearsal, and many hours of careful screening by the chain of command and the individual instructors. Now they were often the results of last minute changes. While this did not overwhelm most of the faculty, it did detract from the instruction of the less flexible members of the faculty. This undoubtedly affected the quality of instruction for the Class of 1974-1975, but the Commandant was slowly and successfully imposing his changes on an often unwilling and misunderstanding faculty.

Major General Cushman considered the use of small work groups to be a vital part of the injection of realism into the classroom. The case study technique with small work groups was the preferred method of study. In December, 1973, the faculty was told, "It is recognized that some subjects are better taught using other methods and this we should do where appropriate."¹⁰ At the same time, they were also told, "A minimum of 50 percent of each course of study in the [1974-1975] . . . curriculum should use the case study method."¹¹ The College quoted TRADOC Regulation 351-3, dated 31 July 1973, to define the case study:

"Method employed in a group situation, whereby the group is presented with a description of, and the requirement to reach solutions to, a complex real-life problem. Material is usually in printed form but can be presented orally or through role-playing, films, a . . . V."

Its use would place the student in a situation where he would have to identify, analyze, and suggest a solution to a problem. Within a small work group, he would have to orally defend his solution, often from the criticism of his peers who perceived the problem differently due to their

varied experience and interests. In such an environment, the student's thinking and problem-solving ability could be developed, and his thoughts could immediately be compared with the thinking and approach of other students. In most instances, there would be no "College solution," for the goal was a soundly reasoned solution by the student.

The transition from a lecture or conference to the work group was not easy. Such a change involved a complete redoing of instructional material, homework reading assignments, view-graph transparencies, lesson plans, and instructor thinking. The entire philosophy and paraphernalia of the classroom had to be changed.

The initial goal was for a minimum of 50 percent of each course of study in the Academic Year 1974-1975 curriculum to use the case study method.¹² The immediate result was a quantum jump in the number of hours each instructor spent in the classroom. For the instructor who was already confused about what General Cushman was seeking, the large increase in the number of hours he spent in the classroom in comparison to his predecessors was hardly conducive to an improvement in morale. Some instructors were also critical of the case study method, which is not without its weaknesses. One instructor concisely described some of the methods shortcomings. "The case study method is unbelievably slow. It does not make maximum use of instructor talent. It often results in a waste of time--a sharing of ignorance." Since the number of instructors in each classroom had increased from one to four, this meant that instructors with less than adequate preparation were sometimes in the classroom. But General Cushman was seeking realism and the involvement of every student. That could not be accomplished when one instructor faced sixty students.

When word of student and faculty discontent with some of General Cushman's changes reached TRADOC headquarters, Lieutenant General Orwin C. Talbott, Deputy Commanding General, TRADOC, visited Fort Leavenworth in April 1975. Upon his departure, he observed:

"The College has gone too far /with work groups/. It needs more lectures and conferences. Maybe a 25% reduction of work groups. The factors influencing this are, 'How will the College faculty cope and give quality instruction.' There is a wide disparity between departments. Some departments are doing well, and have high morale; others, most notably in tactics, are so snowed they need relief."¹³

Most instructors agreed that the College had over-reacted and perhaps gone too far. There were some subsequent readjustments and the amount of work group instruction was reduced to a more manageable level, but the average instructor in 1974-1975 and 1975-1976 still spent more than 100 hours per year in the classroom than his predecessor had in 1972-1973. The substantial increase in the number of "Platform Manhours" can be seen in the following:¹⁴

<u>Academic Year</u>	<u>Total Platform Manhours</u>	<u>Instructors Assigned</u>	<u>Average Platform Manhours per Instructor</u>
1971-1972	30,360	183	165.90
1972-1973	37,959	178	213.25
1973-1974	51,183	193	265.19
1974-1975	79,125	248	319.05
1975-1976	81,024 (Est)	255	317.74

The underlying ideal continued to be the pursuit of realism, and in General Cushman's view that objective could best be met with a small student-to-instructor ratio in the classroom. A close rapport had to be established between the student and the instructor if the proper "spark" of education were ever to be struck.

An integral part of the reforms was the evaluation system. General Cushman later explained the essential purpose of the evaluation system: "What I wanted to do is to have the evaluation reinforce our purposes, which is to make them think."¹⁵ For that reason, the evaluation system devised by General Cushman strongly emphasized subjective grading. Faculty Memorandum Number 17, which contained guidance and policy for the evaluation of student performance, stated:

"The nature of CGSC resident instruction subject matter requires that evaluation be largely subjective. The College seeks to develop qualities like tactical judgment, decision making ability, logical thought, and oral and written expression. These are not susceptible to precise measurement. Practically, only subjective judgments can be made in these areas. The instructor must subjectively evaluate essays and short papers, oral presentations, work group contributions, knowledge of homework assignments and many other behavioral manifestations in the learning process. Some performances, like memory work, logistic calculations, or staff skills can be measured quantitatively. . . The final assessment of the student's academic performance must, therefore, be based on subjective and objective judgments, but emphasizing the former."¹⁶

The requirement for examination week was abolished, thus ending last minute "cramming" for major examinations. Students would be graded frequently, and the largest portion of their grade would depend on classroom performance. The philosophy of war having "no traffic with rules" was strongly emphasized in the faculty memorandum on evaluation by including the lengthy quote on that subject from General George C. Marshall's Infantry in Battle.

In essence, General Cushman called for performance oriented evaluation of the students, but while most instructors supported the intentions of the evaluation system, they encountered difficulty in its application. The clearest example of this was the imposition of a twenty percent ceiling

of "A's" for each course in Academic Year 1974-1975. Faculty Memorandum Number 17 defined the letter grade "A" as follows: "Superior grasp of subject matter, equalled by few of the student's peers in that class at that time, and sufficient to warrant recognition for Academic Excellence." Other possible grades were "B+", "B," "B-," "C," or "U" for unsatisfactory. Unfortunately, few students ever got a "C," and the vast majority of the students received a B." This created what came to be known as the "Leavenworth B," the grade that most students received, whether they worked extremely hard or whether they did little or no work at all. Since the "Leavenworth B" was a respectable grade, the evaluation system probably did not serve to motivate the student. In some cases, precisely the opposite occurred. Nevertheless, few instructors or students sought a complete return to the previous policy of long, formal examinations, and among the students the most vociferous critics were often those receiving the "Leavenworth B".

The evaluation system did accomplish another important objective. As Brigadier General Harrison stated, the evaluation system became the "major leverage" for attaining more contact by instructors with students in small work groups, forcing the faculty to get to know the students, and creating a more informal atmosphere in the classroom. "By doing that," General Harrison explained, "we had. . .an almost dramatic change in the 'we-they' part of the institution."¹⁷ The closer relationship between the student and the instructor was absolutely essential to the successful establishing of a challenging, academic environment. If the student's thought processes were to be developed, there had to be a close exchange of ideas between

the student and the instructor. This contrasts sharply with the one-to-sixty lecture relationship where the student was a passive learner, expected only to absorb the information given to him.

Major General Cushman's approach was thus clearly an educational one, and each of its segments--curriculum content, case study method, small work groups, emphasis on analytical thinking and communicative skills, classroom simulation, and subjective grading--were parts of a coherent whole. Within this intricate puzzle, the pieces were designed to bring realism into the classroom and to end the pedantry that had often plagued Leavenworth. And within this atmosphere the biggest challenge was creating an environment that permitted the student to grow intellectually and that continued to motivate him and stimulate him. But Leavenworth was not seeking to produce only "thinkers." General Harrison explained:

"I don't think I would want Plato. . .as my corps commander. Just being able to think is not quite enough. . .We tried to do it both ways, to get the knowledge of the discipline as well as the thinking application of it."18

The most vigorous critics of this educational approach argued that not enough of the fundamentals had been given to the student. Only time will tell whether their criticism is valid.

ENDNOTES

CHAPTER FOUR

¹Major General John H. Cushman, Welcoming Address to the Regular Course Student Body at the U. S. Army Command and General Staff College, 15 August 1973.

²Private interview conducted with Major General Cushman, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 7 February 1976.

³Ibid.

⁴Colonel Jess B. Hendricks (Chief, Committee One, Department of Tactics), Memorandum for Director, Department of Tactics, Answers to para 5 Questions, Curriculum Paper, 27 September 1973.

⁵Brigadier General B. L. Harrison (Deputy Commandant, CGSC), Memorandum for Staff and Faculty, Guidance for 1974-1975 Academic Year, 12 December 1973.

⁶Quoted in Forrest C. Pogue, George C. Marshall: Education of a General (New York: The Viking Press, 1963), p. 251.

⁷Colonel John D. White (Director, Department of Tactics), Memorandum for Director of Resident Instruction, Center of Gravity of CGSC Instruction, 31 August 1973.

⁸Lieutenant Colonel L. R. Jones (Admin Officer, Department of Tactics), Memo Routing Slip to Major R. A. Doughty, 5 April 1976.

⁹Director, Department of Tactics, Fact Sheet for Commandant, Level of CGSC Tactics Instruction, 4 April 1974.

¹⁰Harrison, Guidance for 1974-1975 Academic Year, 12 December 1973.

¹¹Ibid.

¹²Ibid.

¹³Verbatim Transcript of Lieutenant General Talbott's Debriefing, 10 April 1975.

¹⁴Colonel Herschel E. Chapman (Secretary, CGSC), Memorandum for Department Directors, TRADOC Manpower Survey, 28 August 1975.

¹⁵Private interview with Major General Cushman, 7 February 1976.

¹⁶U. S. Army Command and General Staff College, Faculty Memorandum Number 17, Guidance and Policy for CGSC Evaluation of Student Performance, 11 July 1975, pp. 1-1 and 1-2.

¹⁷Private interview with Brigadier General B. L. Harrison, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 3 February 1976.

¹⁸Ibid.

Chapter 5

Continuing Changes

The changes made by Major General Cushman and Brigadier General Harrison obviously did not concentrate solely on the Department of Tactics. Every department was affected during this period of rapid change, and many changes were closely related to the basic philosophy that had applied to the changes in tactics. For example, the course on staff operations in the Department of Command was changed from an emphasis on staff fundamentals, procedures, and planning in a slowly moving environment, to an emphasis on the same considerations in a fluid environment. Other changes however, were of a different nature, and the evolution of the "Profession of Arms" course is a good example of this.

General Cushman was greatly concerned with the related problems of taking care of the American soldier and having the military officer understand contemporary American society. The new Commandant discussed this topic in several meetings with key members of the College faculty soon after his arrival. He had very strong views on questions concerning the leadership course, and he often attended meeting of faculty members of the Department of Command when this course was discussed. He described his own philosophy in these meetings, and directly participated in establishing the conceptual framework for what would be a completely new course and new approach to the teaching of leadership. The direction of his philosophy is evident in the eventual changing in the spring of 1974 of the name of the Leadership Committee of the Department of Command to the Profession of Arms Committee.

His strong concern with Officer Responsibilities and Standards led him to personally write the portion of the Profession of Arms devoted to that subject. By Academic Year 1975-1976, the instructional objectives for this seven hours of instruction were:

"The student will--

1. Have reassessed his values and goals and reinforced his understanding of professional and ethical standards.
2. Be better able to articulate the responsibilities and obligations of the military profession".¹

The course strongly emphasized student reflection on difficult questions of officer responsibility. The historical examples studied included the failure of the 28th Division to accomplish its mission at Schmidt in November 1944 and the lack of readiness of the 24th division in Korea in July 1950. Among other readings, the students were also furnished a copy of the memorandum to the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, written by Lieutenant General W. P. Peers after his inquiry into the Son My Incident in 1969-1970. That letter emphasized the unique and demanding responsibilities placed upon an officer in a counter-insurgency environment. Other examples were also studied, and each was designed to have the student officer come to grips with his own values and goals and consider how these melded with the professional and ethical standards of the Army officer.

Other projects were the result of gradual accretion or evolution. The growth of the Tactical Command and Control Wargame is a good example of the evolution from one concept to a very different concept, since initial efforts in the area did not envision educating the entire student body on the operations of a division command post. This wargame was the

indirect result of two separate but related projects within the Department of Command: the first being an attempt to reduce the division tactical operations center (TOC) by 50% and the second being an attempt to automate as many of the functions within the operations center as possible. The October War of 1973 had revealed the great threat of Electronic Warfare, and General Cushman was concerned with reducing the electromagnetic "signature" of a division command post. If the size of the operations center were reduced by half and if many of its functions were automated, the command post would not be as susceptible to being located and destroyed by the enemy. When General Cushman learned that Major General Robert M. Shoemaker, Commanding General, 1st Cavalry Division, was also attempting to reduce the size of his division command post, close liaison was established for an exchange of ideas and information.

The Leavenworth projects for automating functions within the CP and reducing the size of the CP began in October 1973, and as each progressed, it was apparent that a Command Post would have to be built if its functions were to be properly studied. With the assistance of the school's training aids section, a main command post for a mechanized division was created. Dummy expandable vans were built of plywood and approval was sought for the issuance of standard communications equipment within a division CP. In the interim, communications equipment was borrowed from Fort Riley, Kansas. After the command post was established, in-depth studies were conducted on the possibility of reducing its size and automating many of its internal functions.

A large portion of the development work within the command post at

Fort Leavenworth was done by students. Initially this consisted of students enrolled in an elective on advanced automatic data processing, but later other students were brought in to write the scenario for the operation and to put together a mechanized division SOP. As part of the project, a group of students and faculty went to Fort Hood, Texas, on two occasions to visit command post exercises conducted by the 1st Cavalry Division and 2nd Armored Division. By April the command post was finished, and several war games were conducted using the students and faculty involved in the project. In June 1974, General Cushman directed that the facility be divided into a Tactical Command Post and a Main Command Post.

During the following academic year, the newly constructed operations facility was extensively used in student instruction. Essentially the students participated in a division map maneuver very similar to that previously conducted at the College. While the students played the "Blue" forces at division, members of the faculty acted as controllers, to include being commanders of adjacent, subordinate, and higher units. The basic purpose of the problem was to emphasize staff functions and procedures, and the exercise was run almost entirely by the Department of Command.

In Academic Year 1975-1976 the war game was greatly increased in scope. The students played the "Red" forces, as well as the "Blue" forces. An American mechanized division faced a Soviet combined arms army, consisting of two motorized rifle divisions and a tank division employing Soviet tactics and doctrine. Student staffs were established for "Blue" and "Red" forces, and students also acted as controllers for both sides, to include acting as commanders of subordinate and higher units. The war game was no longer the sole project of the Department of Command, but

now included support from all other academic departments and the Combined Arms Combat Development Agency. The emphasis was thus strongly on realism with the students having to consider the entire range of problems that might be confronted in the actual situation. Staff functions and procedures remained important, but additional considerations, such as logistics and tactics, also became important.

The Tactical Command and Control Wargame thus originated from questions concerning the vulnerability of the division command post on the modern battlefield. But as the potential of the project became apparent, it was integrated into the curriculum as an important ingredient in the entire concept of bringing realism into the classroom. The war game became an important part of the College's effort to have the students go through the entire process of planning, coordination, and execution. Procedures and fundamentals remained important, but the student was given the additional opportunity to see the repercussion of his good or bad decisions. After the facility was completed, it became a showplace for practically every visiting dignitary that came to Fort Leavenworth.

But the Command and General Staff College was not always a leader in change. One clear example of this is the Officer Personnel Management System (OPMS). Although CGSC initially considered itself not to be threatened by OPMS, the effects of the new system were to be profound. OPMS eventually forced the College to reconsider and defend many of its basic assumptions that had been formed decades earlier. The new system also provided the battleground for the implementation of some ideas inherent in the "come-as-you-are" war philosophy, the program of General DePuy,

and in the environment for change continuing after 1973. Examples of questions brought to the forefront by OPMS are: the size of the class; the composition of the class in terms of reserve and active duty officers; the content of the curriculum; the length of the course; the need for an "associate" type course for those not selected to attend the regular course; the nature of the essential military information needed by Army field grade officers; and the relationship of the electives program to an officer's primary and secondary specialties. In short, the fundamental nature and purpose of Leavenworth had to be reconsidered as a result of OPMS.

As mentioned in previous chapters, CGSC course content in 1973 seemed to satisfy the basic requirements of OPMS. The core curriculum provided what could be described as the essential knowledge required for the grade of major, and its content could easily be adjusted if the specific requirements for field grade education were modified. The necessity for "specialty" education could be met with electives, which could be put together in a tailored program according to an officer's prior education and experience. Recognition of the need to directly confront OPMS, however, became evident when TRADOC's review of the professional military education requirements for the grade of major required CGSC to determine whether its core curriculum could provide the broad foundation of knowledge required by each and every field grade officer, regardless of specialty. The importance of this can best be understood if one recalls that previously a Leavenworth education, almost without exception, had been considered the single most important educational experience for a field grade officer.

In August 1974 the College was informed by the chief of a TRADOC OPMS

Task Group that several alternative plans were being considered for Leavenworth. Though the number of alternative plans soon increased to five, these were soon reduced to three basic alternatives. In December 1974, the College was formally required by General DePuy to comment on these three alternatives.² These included: a single 40-week regular course with two reserve component courses of approximately 18 weeks; a single 40-week regular course per year with approximately one-third of the class departing after completion of the core curriculum; and a single 40-week regular course per year with one 18-week TDY CGSC course per year. In the last two alternatives, active Army and reserve component officers would be integrated for the core curriculum, which would be presented as part of the regular course and which would be the only instruction received by those officers in the 18-week course.

Other alternatives were also eventually discussed. One particularly important one was offered in late 1975 by the Professional Military Education Subcommittee of the Department of Defense Committee on Excellence in Education, chaired by the Honorable William K. Brehm, Assistant Secretary of Defense, Manpower, and Reserve Affairs. This alternative suggested that the one-year regular course might be replaced by two half-year courses, much along the lines of the Armed Forces Staff College. During the process of considering these various alternatives, Leavenworth was forced to reconsider and defend its basic purpose. The fact that a program had been previously used was no longer accepted as prima facie evidence that it should continue to be used.

The alternative finally recommended by the TRADOC OPMS Task Group followed the preference of the Command and General Staff College. That

ie, the regular course would consist of one annual 40 academic week period. Additionally, two reserve component classes of 18 academic weeks would be conducted at Leavenworth, with one of the classes being integrated into the regular course and the other class being conducted separately in the spring. The regular course would consist of approximately 960 officers (820 active duty U. S. Army officers, 60 sister service officers, and 80 allied officers). Approximately 130 reserve component officers would be integrated in the fall into the regular course. Active duty officers not selected to attend the resident CGSC course would receive only the core curriculum through the nonresident instruction mode.³

The core curriculum would be designed as the "central focus" of education for officers in the grade of major. The TRADOC OFMS Task Group stated:

"By definition /the core curriculum / should consist of what every officer needs to know about combined arms tactical operations and support activities for the Army-in-the-field."⁴

The core curriculum would be presented during the first phase of the Leavenworth regular class and to the reserve component classes. It would also be packaged for the nonresident instruction. Since AR 310-10 limited student TDY periods to less than 20 calendar weeks without prior DA approval, the core curriculum would have to fit within that time constraint.⁵ This restraint placed an especially heavy burden on the Department of Tactics, which would have to present its entire core curriculum during that initial 18 weeks. None of the other departments faced this rigorous demand.

As for electives, General DePuy furnished the basic guidance in December 1974:

"There are two significant areas that need to be highlighted. First is combined arms tactics at brigade and division level, to include managing the training problems associated therewith. Next is the management and allocation of Army resources, to include techniques of conducting staff research and developing conceptual alternatives for military problems."⁶

This focusing of the electives was repeated by the OPMS Task Group, which concluded: "This approach to electives will allow the tailoring of an individual program for each student to support his or her combination of specialties."⁷

The initial Leavenworth concept for supporting OPMS emphasized the selection of "majors" with possible choices varying, for example, from tactics, to logistics, to strategic studies, to operations and force development. Out of his twelve elective courses, the student in Academic Year 1974-1975 was required to take six electives in his "major." The other six were optional choices, and the student could use them to support either his primary or alternate specialty, or for personal enrichment with his choices supporting neither of his OPMS specialties. This did not mean the student could structure his electives program without any regard to Army needs. Each student was assigned a faculty counselor in the beginning of the course, and this officer monitored the selection of electives by the student. In a June 1974 faculty meeting, General Cushman explained the underlying purpose of having a faculty counselor.

"There may be some negotiation, counseling, persuasion, orientation, or call it what you will, that moves some of these students around from the particular major selection chosen by them to another major selection which the authorities of this College believe would be more appropriate, both for them and for the Army. Hopefully, there will not be many such, on whom we will want to change majors."⁸

The program, however, was not designed specifically to support OPMS, since

the College had been informed by TRADOC that the CGSC program to support OPMS could be delayed until Academic Year 1976-1977.⁹

In January 1975 the "majors" system was stringently criticized by Lieutenant General Orwin C. Talbott, Deputy Commanding General, TRADOC. His objections were explicit:

"The current CGSC method of packaging the electives into a major program does not appear to be the best solution to support OPMS. . . Seven of the CGSC major programs are a reflection of the academic department structure, which is not consistent with OPMS specialties. As such, these major programs do not reflect the OPMS specialties or any logical combination of specialties."¹⁰

The College was already aware of TRADOC's reservations about the majors program, for the chief of the TRADOC OPMS Task Group had voiced concern on several occasions about the system not completely meshing with OPMS. General Talbott's letter, however, was the first written example of TRADOC disapproval at the general officer level.

The reaction at Leavenworth was immediate. A special study was conducted to determine the necessary steps to implement the OPMS program ~~during~~ Academic Year 1975-1976. The timing was opportune, for the reorganization of the Officer Personnel Directorate (OPD) was planned for M.T. September 1975 in order to better manage officers under OPMS. Also, students in the 1975-1976 regular course would be assigned their primary and alternate OPMS specialties prior to their arrival at the College. Since no unmanageable obstacles were foreseen, the study group recommended discontinuing the majors program and replacing it with a program "providing for student concentration of studies directly associated with the training requirements of his primary and alternate OPMS specialties."¹¹

Consequently, the selection of electives in Academic Year 1975-1976 was ruled by OPMS considerations. The College required the student to successfully complete nine academic elective courses and a special study project as a tenth elective during the academic year. For those students governed by the OPMS program, seven of the electives had to be taken from those courses related to the primary and alternate OPMS specialties. The other two electives could be selected from any of the electives offered in the College catalogue. The precise mix of courses between an individual's primary and alternate specialties would be determined by a joint effort between the counselor and each student, and would consider the student's past experience, education, or possible future assignment after graduation. For those students not under OPMS (Judge Advocate General's Corps, the Chaplains Corps, the Army Medical Department, sister service officers, and allied officers), any nine electives could be taken. Allied officers were given the option of participating in the special study project as their tenth elective.

Each student was given a detailed listing of the OPMS specialties and the "essential," "recommended," and "optional" courses supporting each specialty. There were no "mandatory" courses; however, the student was actually required to take the "essential" course for his specialties unless the skills involved in such a course had been mastered through prior experience or education. The final result was a system providing limited flexibility to the student and meeting the requirements of OPMS. Thus, no complete rewrite of the electives program had been required or attempted, since the change had been as much one of "packaging" as it had been of philosophy. The array of electives remained essentially the same, but the programs were

now grouped under OPMS specialties, rather than "majors."

One of the most important effects of OPMS was a redesigning of the Leavenworth mission. This new mission was initially received in a December 19, 1974, letter from General DePuy to General Cushman. It stated:

"The mission of the Command and General Staff College is to improve and broaden the professional competence of selected commissioned officers, to prepare them for command and staff positions of greater responsibility, and to provide them a firm foundation for continued professional growth."¹²

While this statement of the mission was more general than any other post-World War II mission, the "purpose" and "objectives" paragraphs made the mission much more precise. The student would no longer be prepared to be a commander of a division or corps; instead, he would be prepared to command a battalion, brigade, or equivalent-size unit. As for staff duties, the Leavenworth student would be trained as a principal staff officer from brigade through higher echelons, as an Army general staff officer, and as a major Army, joint, unified, or combined command staff officer. Thus, while the level of command for which the student was prepared was dramatically lowered, staff preparation was broadened by the addition of the lower staff. Realistically speaking, however, the staff and command functions were closely linked, and the new mission was the fruition of the entire process of lowering the center of gravity that had begun in July 1973.

Nevertheless, there was a subtle but significant difference in the TRADOC and Leavenworth perceptions of how this mission should be accomplished. That is, the College perceived the mission as an educational one, while TRADOC perceived it as a training one. The traditional distinction between education and training was offered in 1962 by a board of officers from the US& Continental Army Command reviewing the Army schooling system. It stated:

"Education is defined as formal instruction and study leading to intellectual development; training implies instruction and supervised practice toward acquisition of a skill."¹³

In that sense, the educational philosophy of General Cushman strongly emphasized developing the thinking processes and the analytical and communicative capabilities of the students. This contrasts with what General DePuy called the "training factory." He explained:

"We are going to have a training factory, and that training factory is going to take doctrine, and then through analysis and orientation on determining critical tasks and missions, is going to produce training programs, materials, simulators, tests, devices, and everything for export."¹⁴

That training would also be "exported" to the classroom.

Within the TRADOC philosophy, the critical question became job analysis. A representative of TRADOC explained:

"The question in job analysis, the critical question for us, is--what is it that the man does in the field, and how can we take that list of tasks that we think he performs, and sort between those which are critical and those which are not critical, because we cannot afford to do more than that which is critical."¹⁵

Since the TRADOC OPMS Task Group had already concluded that resident training should be used to "prepare officers specifically for their next immediate assignment," each student--according to the TRADOC view--should be trained in the critical tasks he would perform in his next assignment. If the American Army were to "win the first battle," its officers would have to know their duties in great detail; there would be no time on the battlefield to learn them.

General Cushman's philosophy was reflected in the College catalog.

"Is the College a graduate level institution or an advanced training school? Does it train officers or does it educate them? Does it prepare officers for the short term--their next one or two assignments--or, knowing that this is the last formal military education for about 75 percent of its graduates, does it prepare them for the long term? The answers to these questions are to be found in a mix of the seemingly disparate elements, for the College educates and trains; it prepares for the short and the long terms; it is, in academic terms, a terminal degree graduate level institution, along the model of a law school, medical school, or an engineering school. It is through the amalgamation of different modes and

styles that the College turns out the graduate who is skilled in techniques and procedures, well-versed in the factual, and yet possessed of the broad viewpoint required of commanders and staff officers who are able to see the forest while knowing each of the trees."16

Thus, one approach emphasized drilling the essentials of certain fundamental tasks into the minds of the student, while the other emphasized developing critical thinking ability without becoming overly concerned with fundamentals. One stressed the immediate, while the other attempted a balance between the short term and the long term. But the philosophy of TRADOC has evidently prevailed over providing the basis for future officer development. As with other changes, only time will indicate which philosophy was correct.

Applying the TRADOC philosophy at Leavenworth was and is no easy task. With the tremendous diversity of students in terms of branches, specialties, and backgrounds, there was always been a wide range of interests and abilities. At the same time, Leavenworth graduates move into a myriad of possible duty assignments. The exact range of those duties is unfortunately not currently known, since no detailed study of subsequent duties of Leavenworth graduates has been conducted for several years. But the idea of the core curriculum providing the basic professional military education for every field grade officer, regardless of his OPMS specialties, with the electives providing the opportunity for the student to develop his OPMS specialties, approaches the ideal of preparing the officer for his next assignment. At the same time the strong emphasis on the educational approach within the classroom ensures that a modicum of a balance has been struck between the demands of the short term and the long term.

The appropriateness of that balance is point of disagreement among the faculty of the Command and General Staff College perhaps more so than

among the College's hierarchy. Part of the problem is the fact that each of the departments has been affected differently by movement of the center of gravity of instruction, with some of the departments hardly being affected. For example, many instructors within the Department of Tactics consider the increased emphasis on the battalion and brigade to be appropriate. On the other hand, many instructors teaching Strategy of the Profession of Arms consider the current focus of instruction to be far "too restrictive." Obviously enough, an articulated College position on a specific center of gravity could not be applied uniformly to every teaching committee. In the same vein, some instructors feel that the redirection of the College mission has had a very negative effect. That is, by concentrating on "winning the first battle" of the next war, and emphasizing battalion and brigade level instruction, CGSC is failing to prepare most officers for their next assignment, which will not be with the Army in the field, much less with battalion, brigade, or division. Others feel that preparing to "win the first battle" subverts the basic nature of the College and places in jeopardy the possibility of "winning the second battle." These officers argue that too much emphasis on the immediate precludes development of capacities among the officer corps that will be essential to the long-term development and readiness of the Army. There are no easy answers for any of the critics, regardless of whether one supports the short-term or the long-term argument.

Other changes in CGSC were also important during this period. For example, the College began another reorganization in late 1975. The Management Committee, which teaches resources management and force structuring, was moved from the Department of Command to the Department of Logistics which was retitled the Department of Resource Management (DREM). The

newly titled department will have responsibility for teaching combat service support, installation management, and force structure design and development. Another change occurred in the Department of Strategy. Its instruction on Strategic Mobility was transferred to the Resource Management Department, and its instruction on airborne and amphibious operations was transferred to the Department of Tactics. Within the Department of Strategy, a new Military History Committee was formed for the purpose of teaching various subjects of a historical nature that had previously been taught by other committees within the department. The name of the department was also changed. Since strategy comprised only a part of the department's instruction, it was retitled the Department of Unified and Combined Operations.

The final result of General Cushman's change in the organization of the Command and General Staff College resulted in the College being organized along more functional lines. The Department of Tactics taught practically all tactical instruction; the Department of Resource Management taught combat service support, as well as installation management, force structure design and development, and strategic mobility; the Department of Command taught staff operations and the profession of arms; and the Department of Unified and Combined Operations taught a mixture of strategy, military history, security assistance, and unified and combined operations. There were also changes in the staff organization of the Command and General Staff College, but these will be discussed in the next chapter.

One area in which there was undoubtedly too much change was in the frequent turnover of department heads and committee chiefs. No one was

"relieved" of his duties, but the combination of permanent changes of station, retirements, promotions, and job rotation ensured a continual movement of personnel through many of the key positions in the College. This rapid turnover of colonels assigned to some of the key instructional positions in the College from 1973 to 1976 is reflected in Table 3. Amidst the rapid changes in curriculum and organization, these personnel movements did little to make those changes easier.

By 1976 practically every aspect of the College had been affected by General Cushman's changes. The curriculum had been thoroughly analyzed and portions of it significantly changed. The methods of instruction had been drastically altered with the incorporation of the small work group and the case study method. The approach to electives had been changed on several occasions, and the swift transition from "majors" to OPMS specialties seemed for much of the faculty, to be a continuation of the many hasty changes of the past. As many instructors moved their desks from one department to another, they probably repeated the phrase frequently heard in the hallways of Bell Hall; "The only thing that doesn't change at Leavenworth is change."

ENDNOTES

CHAPTER FIVE

¹U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Advance Sheet M9001-2, Officer Responsibilities and Standards.

²General William E. DePuy (CG, TRADOC), Letter to Major General John H. Cushman, 19 December 1974.

³U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, "Education and Training of Officers under the Personnel Management System," 14 March 1975, Vol. II, pp. III-15, III-16.

⁴Ibid., p. III-13.

⁵Colonel Marshall Sanger, (Director of Resident Instruction), Decision Paper for Commandant, Implementation of the OPMS Program in College Instruction, 27 December 1974, Tab B.

⁶General DePuy to Major General Cushman, 19 December 1974.

⁷TRADOC, "Education and Training of Officers Under the Officer Personnel Management System," 14 March 1975, Vol. II, p III-14.

⁸Major General Cushman, Remarks of Commandant Prepared for 26 June 1974 Faculty Meeting.

⁹General DePuy to Major General Cushman, 19 December 1974. See also Sanger, Implementation of the OPMS Program in College Instruction, 27 December 1974.

¹⁰Lieutenant General Orwin C. Taibott (Deputy CG, TRADOC), Letter to Major General Cushman, 22 January 1975.

¹¹Colonel Marshall Sanger (Director of Resident Instruction), Decision Paper to Commandant, Implementation of the OPMS Program in /# College Instruction, 19 February 1975.

¹²General DePuy to Major General Cushman, 19 December 1974.

¹³Headquarters, U.S. Continental Army Command, Lieutenant General John P. Daley, "Report of a Board of Officers in the Army School System, 1 March 1962," (Daley Board) p. 2-1.

¹⁴Headquarters, United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, "Commander's Conference, Fort Monroe, Virginia, 10-11 December 1975 (FOUO)," 6 January 1975, p. 1-25.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 2-4.

¹⁶U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, "75-76 Catalog," Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, p. 1-10.

Chapter 6

Doctrine and Training Developments

As a result of Operation STEADFAST in 1973, the Command and General Staff College reentered the arena for doctrine formulation. While this new responsibility was initially welcomed, the writing and export of doctrine soon began to consume an ever-greater portion of the College's resources in time and personnel. As the driving demand for doctrine became an increasingly important and difficult task, its formulation began to absorb resources previously monopolized by instructional demands. After the concept of training developments was introduced in late 1975, the College found its traditional instructional mission threatened by the demanding requirements of exporting training and formulating doctrine.

The traditional reason for having the Army schools write doctrine was concisely stated by the Department of the Army Board (the Williams Board) for reviewing the Army schooling system in 1958.

"In considering the adequacy of the system for the development of current doctrine it is apparent, by the nature of their instructional mission, that the schools are required to be thoroughly familiar with the organization and operational employment of the units within their scope. Individual instructors must prepare and present units of instruction, and must be able to answer questions from the student body and to engage in detailed discussions covering all aspects of their instruction. Many of the students will have served recently in assignments which allow expression of opinion based on practical experience. This influence of the student body, the academic atmosphere of the school or college, and the practical necessity for an intimate knowledge of the material he is teaching combine to make the instructor the most knowledgeable person in his particular field."¹

But the Williams Board recognized that the system was not without its faults, especially regarding personnel resources. Consequently, it recommended that the Army schools be provided additional personnel to support the

demanding requirements of examining, evaluating, and formulating doctrine.

The Command and General Staff College strongly supported this recommendation. Its comments on the recommendations of the Williams Board stated:

"Due to the unprecedented and accelerated rate of doctrinal change, the system for the development of current doctrine and training literature also should be continuously examined and evaluated. Through no fault of the individuals operating the system the useful life of a field manual today is approaching a time span less than the time required for its coordination, review and publication under current procedures in some instances."²

The doctrinal workload of the College became increasingly burdensome, and during the period 1 September 1960 to 31 August 1961, the College wrote 28 field manuals, 3 Department of Army pamphlets, and 4 training circulars. It also reviewed another 59 field manuals, 3 Department of Army pamphlets, 4 training circulars, and more than a hundred Army regulations, combat development projects, position papers, Tables of Organization and Equipment, etc. The complexity of the problem is reflected in a handwritten note by Major General Harold K. Johnson, then Commandant of CGSC, on the staff study listing the large number of doctrinal projects: "It is apparent that some kind of change is desirable. We just can't seem to find the key."³

A momentary solution to the problem was found in 1962 when the College was removed from the area of doctrine formulation. A 1962 briefing at the College described the new system:

"Prior to this year, development of doctrine was one of the assigned missions of the college. The recent army reorganization eliminated the college doctrinal mission but the close interrelationship of doctrine development with the instructional role of the college was recognized. The new agencies assuming responsibility for doctrine, the Combined Arms Group and the Combined Arms Combat Development Agency, were left contiguous to the college to facilitate coordination. Further, the Commandant of the College has been designated as the Commanding General of the Combined Arms Group. As requirements in specific doctrinal areas are recognized by the college, they are transmitted to the Combined Arms Combat Agency for further study and development. Doctrine developed in the Combined Arms Combat Development

Agency is transmitted to the college for review and comment. The college plays an important role in the doctrinal field by testing the new concepts in an instructional environment."⁴

Nevertheless, problems still existed. In September 1965, Major General Harry J. Lemley, Jr., wrote a letter to the Department of Army Board (the Haines Board) reviewing Army officer schooling. He was responding to a question about the proper role of the faculty in the formulation of doctrine, and stated:

"The faculty should be responsible for the formulation of doctrine. The teaching of doctrine does not separate naturally from its formulation. The faculty is still required to comment on all CDC proposed doctrine. In order to accomplish this the faculty must become deeply involved in doctrinal studies even though the manpower for this purpose has been transferred to CDC. The school faculties and Commandants should be brought back fully into the formulation of doctrine. The expansion of CDC to the 'CD and Schools Command' with the collocated agencies reassigned to the schools would accomplish this. This current system works, but it does not work as well as when the schools are charged with doctrine formulation."⁵

In 1973, the pendulum of charge reversed directions, and Command and General Staff College was again charged with doctrine formulation.

Though more than ten years had passed, many of the same problems that had been faced before 1962 were to be faced after 1973.

Major General Cushman considered the formulation of doctrine to be closely related to his effort to increase realism in the classroom. In October 1973, he spoke at the Echelons Above Division and FM 100-15 Conference and stated:

"We must consider only real or prospective situations--operate in an environment of reality. We have to consider the real world and the threat facing the United States and the Army in that real world. The theories or doctrine that we put forth here should be perceived as being derived from observations of reality and from practical and actual experience, and applicable to the real world."⁶

From the doctrinal point of view, this meant that many new ideas associated

with new doctrine could be brought into the classroom for student discussion and understanding. An example of this is the student's introduction to the College's draft of FM 100-5, Operations. The draft manual was circulated among the faculty and the students, and was a frequent topic of discussion in the classroom. Though the manual was eventually rejected by TRADOC, its introduction into the classroom evidently added to the realism General Cushman was seeking. One student wrote a letter to the Commandant stating:

"The apparent revolution occurring in U.S. Tactical doctrine today has excited most of us in the classroom. We are being oriented to look for critical issues (in what depth should we deploy; what use of terrain will be most effective) rather than just the right structures (task organization, control measures, etc.)...."⁷

Student exposure to new doctrine, however, was not limited solely to classroom discussion. In many instances, there was direct student involvement in the formulation of doctrine.

The Command and General Staff College has not always been willing to utilize student efforts in doctrinal research. For example, a student research program was suggested in 1961, but the Commandant, Major General Harold K. Johnson, dismissed the project with a cryptic note. "Drop this project. There is a strong probability of a lesser return from a reduced span of experience as we draw farther away from combat experience."⁸ But in 1973 student assistance in the formulation of doctrine was actively sought; it was obtained through three different areas: extracurricular work groups, special electives, and student research projects.

The extracurricular work groups were essentially students participating in doctrinal development through contributions in non-credit work groups. As such, these projects were "over-loads," and some topics addressed were: Air Cavalry Combat Brigade, Corps Headquarters TOE, War Games, Military

Operations in Built-up Areas, and Command and Staff Organization, Functions and Procedures.⁹ Students also participated in special electives devoted to particular doctrinal projects. Two of those already mentioned in this study concerned the Nature and Characteristics of Ground Combat and the Tactical Operations Center. Others were the Yom Kippur War, Advanced Management, Materiel Acquisition, and Advanced Military Intelligence.

General DePuy had very specific views about CGSC student participation in the production of draft manuals, and he expressed these views in June 1974 during a visit to Fort Leavenworth. His views were summarized as follows:

"The CG has reservations about their use and feels students can only be used effectively if closely supervised by the faculty. As he sees it, the CGSC faculty devises a concept that is approved by HQ TRADOC (either the CG or the Manual Editorial Review Board). Using the approved concept as a guide, students in the appropriate elective program write a draft manual. As an example, CGSC faculty may develop concepts on 'How to Fight' in urban areas. Using the approved concepts as guidelines, students in the Urban Warfare Elective under the supervision of the CGSC faculty would do the necessary research and write a draft manuscript."¹⁰

This basic procedure was essentially the one followed by Fort Leavenworth.

Student research projects also became a source of assistance in doctrine¹ formulation. An August 1975 letter to the Director of Defense Education concisely expressed the purpose of the special study projects:

"The primary thrust of the CGSC student special study projects is to make a direct contribution to the solution of problems confronting Army forces or joint forces."¹¹ In Academic Year 1973-1974 examples of student research projects were the Delphi Method Case Study, Installation Accounts System, and the Air Cavalry Troop. The College continued to draw on student resources for critical projects, and by Academic Year 1975-1976 more than sixty students had been excused from 4 or 5 electives in order

to complete their projects. Though the standard research project counted for one elective, approximately two hundred students in 1975-1976 were permitted to have their project count for two or more electives.¹² In January 1976, General Cushman explained why some students were permitted to drop as many as five electives in order to complete their special study project: "In some cases that is not done for the student's convenience; that is done for the institution's benefit."¹³ To meet the driving demands of TRADOC for such tasks as producing a quality anti-armor system program review, Leavenworth has probably been forced into using whatever resources--including students--it could locate.

Students thus actively participated in College efforts to formulate doctrine and solve problems facing the Army. Their participation, however, brings into focus the fundamental question of the purpose of the College and the contribution of the special electives and study projects to the instructional mission of the College. Some instructors feel student participation in such projects has exceeded the bounds of education; others cogently argue that many of the special electives and projects inject realism into the course and develop the critical thinking and research ability of the student. In the final analysis, both contentions are probably correct, but there is a potential for abuse by over-using student resources. The system for utilizing student efforts in the formulation of doctrine will evidently have to be closely monitored in the future to insure that significant straying from the educational mission of the College does not occur.

The discussion of student participation in doctrine formulation, however, should not obscure the very real fact that the major participants

were members of the faculty. As previously mentioned, the College was involved by January 1976 in writing 20 field manuals, 7 training circulars, 1 army training program, and 2 TRADOC bulletins. The magnitude of this task was considerably increased in March 1976 when the College also received the responsibility for writing a field manual on tactical nuclear operations and two field manuals on the infantry brigades and the armor and mechanized infantry brigade.

When the College was initially assigned responsibility for writing doctrine, the authors of the various projects were instructors in the academic departments. In most cases the author/instructors continued to teach while they were conducting research for or writing the new doctrine. Needless to say, this placed a great deal of pressure on the author/instructor. The doctrinal project often did not increase the individual's ability to teach. Since the projects were so diverse, they rarely directly related to what the instructor was teaching, but if the project happened to coincide with the material being taught, the instructional potential of the officer was obviously increased. The eventual formation of doctrine committees within several of the academic departments alleviated a portion of the pressure on some of these individuals, since most were no longer required to teach while they were writing doctrine.

The College had a Director of Doctrine, but this office did not directly participate in the writing of doctrine. The office had been established in June 1972 to monitor the doctrinal efforts of CGSC. This included coordinating and reviewing training literature referred to the College by other schools and agencies, and monitoring college participation in combat development activities. It also included coordinating and monitoring

College preparation of training literature, but this preparation was predominantly conducted in the academic departments. These departments remained the centers of expertise for the teaching and writing of doctrine.

Much of the difficulty with formulating doctrine lay in the same area as before 1962. That is, the College needed additional officers to handle the complex problems of doctrine formulation. As a result of Operation STEADFAST, the College was given 25 full time additional officers, but this apparently was only about half the number actually needed. And the task of preparing doctrine remained a tedious, demanding, time-consuming task for authors of the doctrinal literature and classroom instructions.

Another facet of the problem of doctrine formulation centered on the relationship between the Combined Arms Combat Development Agency (CACDA) and the Command and General Staff College. Theoretically there should have been a "symbiosis" between CACDA and the College on the development, teaching, and dissemination of tactical doctrine. If there were a symbiosis, however, it was an uncomfortable one. The source of the problem lay in the diverse nature of the two institutions: one was highly technical, relying on mathematics and systems analysis; the other more "thought oriented," emphasizing ideas and education. But cooperation between the two institutions was immensely important, for as the thinking of the Army became more systems oriented, new doctrine had to be based on technical studies completed by CACDA. The days of an author/instructor in CGSC sitting down and writing a manual totally on his own were a thing of the past. CACDA also provided significant amounts of information to instructors on threats, enemy forces, new tactics, and new techniques.

Several steps were taken to improve relations between the two institutions. One of these was the movement of the Commandant's office out of Bell Hall into the headquarters building of CACDA. Another included the exchange of personnel. For example, Colonel A. C. Ring, who had previously served as the College's Director of Doctrine, Director of Resident Instruction, and Academic Chief of Staff, became the Assistant Deputy Commander of CACDA in late 1975. Similarly, a number of instructors were moved from the academic departments to CACDA. At the same time CACDA personnel were actively used in the College's instructional program. This included the teaching of electives and participating in the Tactical Command and Control Wargame.

Problems, nonetheless, continue to exist. Members of CACDA and the College resent being pulled from their development of instructional duties to participate in an activity controlled by the other institution. One CGSC instructor complained, "CACDA is a leech on the faculty; they demand a lot of time and make small positive inputs to the faculty." The countering accusation is also to be found in the CACDA community. In the midst of continuing change, the role of CACDA and its relationship to the College is still the subject of much discussion. Given the passage of time, the defining of the roles of CGSC and CACDA, and the maturing of their relationship, however, the two organizations will probably work more closely together to improve the ability of each to perform their given mission.

Despite the personnel shortages and the uncomfortable relationship between CACDA and CGSC, there were never any doubts that the doctrinal mission had to be fulfilled. General DePuy strongly emphasized doctrinal literature, since he believed the written material would have a long-term

effect on the Army. In a visit to Fort Leavenworth in February 1975, he stated:

"FM's are important and they do have an effect over time. FM's provide the thread of continuity because what is on the shelf is used as a reference in all the orderly rooms, company training rooms, battalion training areas, schools, NCO schools around the world by the US Army. These field manuals on the shelf are used by the commanders and the men on the staff as they pass through the units. So over the years a cumulative effect occurs over time. Actually, the field manuals, you might say are the only consistent game in town. What you are writing is going to affect the colonels, lieutenant colonels, majors, captains, lieutenants and sergeants. The impact of these manuals will be a thousand fold. It will be more significant than anyone imagines. What is put into these manuals will be THE Army way and it will show up for decades."¹⁴

If there were any uncertainty about where General DePuy's priorities lay, such remarks as these rapidly eliminated the doubts.

In late 1975, several developments occurred that struck at the heart of Leavenworth's method of formulating doctrine and also at its fundamental educational mission. The new thrust came from an area known as "Training Developments." In October 1975 at a College staff meeting, General Cushman stated:

"General DePuy has given us a couple of important missions. The first involves what he calls training development. Training development means 'how to improve the Army's effectiveness through good training'—it involves field manuals, other media, and methods of training. Leavenworth will be the focal point for training of staffs and commanders, with the brigade being the center of interest..."¹⁵

During the same period, CGSC was notified of a proposed service school reorganization along the lines of a TRADOC "school model."¹⁶ TRADOC envisioned this "type" organization as being the most effective system for enabling the schools to perform their functions.

The College had embarked on a new reorganization in August 1975, and General Cushman concluded:

"No change in this concept seems indicated. [But] the internal organization of the College Departments will differ from past models in that there will be groupings of training developments, education and training and combat development within each department. Each department will have some responsibilities in each of those areas of the Combined Arms Center responsibility."¹⁷

To comply with the spirit of the "school model," General Cushman also perceived a need to adjust the responsibilities of the three general officers assigned to the Combined Arms Center. Brigadier General Benjamin L. Harrison remained Deputy Commandant, but he assumed the additional title of Deputy Commander, Combined Arms Center, for Training Developments. Brigadier General William C. Louisell, as Assistant Commandant, was totally responsible for resident instruction at CGSC. He essentially was Deputy to the Commander of the Combined Arms Center for Education and Training, but received the additional responsibility of Deputy for Battle Analysis. Major General Morris J. Brady remained the Deputy Commander of CACDA, but also became the Deputy of Combat Developments of the Combined Arms Center. The general officer responsibilities were thus broadly divided between Training Development, Education and Training, and Combat Developments. Though these changes swept aside many previous practices and procedures, they were cosmetic in comparison to the changes actually desired by TRADOC.

The extent of those desires became apparent at a TRADOC Commander's Conference at Fort Monroe, Virginia, on 10-11 December 1975. The thrust of those desires was summarized by General DePuy. "I want to reduce the training that goes on inside TRADOC to the absolute minimum. Now I mean that. To the absolute minimum that is necessary."¹⁸ Brigadier General Maxwell R. Thurman, Deputy Chief of Staff for Resource Management, TRADOC, explained that the TRADOC community was changing its "character

from a residential or in-house or institutional instructional system to an out-in-the-field system..."¹⁹ The implication of this redirection of the Army schooling system for CGSC was expressed by Major General Paul F. Gorman, Deputy Chief of Staff for Training, TRADOC. "The fundamental problem at Leavenworth is inward lookingness. You are still focused on training the majors. It is important to do that. But there is a larger objective, training the force."²⁰

These points were explained in more detail by the TRADOC Commander and Staff. The Deputy Director of the Training Management Institute explained:

"We know there is a very large and growing body of opinion in academic circles, experience in the professional world, and cost evidence in the commercial world, among tradespeople, that the best place, the most economical and the most efficient place to train people for the job, and I'm talking about adults, is on the job, or very near the job."²¹

General DePuy explained that the schools would look like a "training factory." They would take doctrine, and after "determining critical tasks and missions," would "produce training programs, materials, simulators, tests, devices, and everything for export."²² This material would be exported to the Reserve Components, active Army units, and the students at the school. General DePuy described these three areas: "They are all equally important, but today we are not organized to make them equally important, and therefore we are not doing our job."²³ Under General DePuy's concept, the training of active Army and reserve units would receive the same priority as training students at the schools.

Another important change concerned determining what, where, and how to train. Under the TRADOC "School Model 76", this was to be taken from the academic departments and placed under the Office of the Director

of Training Developments. The TRADOC Deputy Chief of Staff for Resource Management explained, "I/n the new school model we are going to see a downplay of the traditional role of the academic department head. It becomes more functional and somewhat less omnipotent."²⁴ Another member of the TRADOC staff said, "We want to get the crucial decisions out of the hands of the instructor."²⁵ Areas pertaining to training developments and combat developments would be removed completely from the academic departments. Apparently the departments would retain only resident instruction responsibilities, but the content of that instruction would be controlled by the Director of Training Developments.

The problems inherent in TRADOC School Model 76 for the Command and General Staff College were immensely difficult, for they struck at many of the fundamental precepts that had guided the College curriculum for decades. For example, the centers of expertise had always been the academic departments, even though decisions on course content had been frequently made by the Commandant's personal decision. In the December TRADOC Commander's Conference, General Cushman offered an alternative solution. He said, "W/hat you have in the Department of Tactics is training developments, trainers, and combat developments in the subject area. That is what I am talking about, keeping that under that one responsible subject matter."²⁶ General DePuy's answer was clear; "I am saying that that is not what we want."²⁷

In January 1976, General DePuy was briefed at Fort Leavenworth on training development actions. He accepted the CGSC plan at that time, though there may have been some misunderstanding concerning where the training developers were actually located. Since most of the training

developers remained in the academic departments with their development efforts available to the training directorate, many crucial decisions remained with the academic departments. The academic departments also were not placed directly under the control of the training directorate. The concept of the author/instructor within the departments thus remained intact, though it kept "one foot in both boats," the traditional one and the School Model 76 one. Though steps have been taken to partially apply the TRADOC model, its final configuration and application at CGSC are still most pressing problems, which will have to be resolved in the near future.

While the exact effects of exporting training outside Leavenworth are as yet unknown, the major thrust of the program is to "train the colonels." CGSC was given the additional mission of developing and implementing an Army-wide program to "train maneuver battalion and brigade commanders and their staffs in the control and coordination of combined arms operations."²⁸ Inherent in this mission was the requirement to identify the critical tasks for maneuver battalion and brigade command groups. This "front-end analysis" would result in a list of critical tasks, for which performance standards, training objectives, and evaluation criteria would next be determined. Needless to say, the College found this to be a very difficult task, since the broad range of responsibilities and duties of battalion and brigade commanders was difficult to precisely identify. Such an effort had not previously been attempted, but by March 1976 a draft critical task list had been developed and sent to the field for comment.

An important facet of this program was the development of battle

simulations. Among the several projects were the Combined Arms Tactical Training Simulator (CATTS), the Computer Assisted Map Maneuver System (CAMMS), the First Battle Simulation, the Dunn-Kempf Battle Simulation, and the Longthrust Battle Simulation. For example, the Dunn-Kempf Simulation is "particularly appropriate for training at company level and below in small unit tactics, weapon system capabilities and employment techniques, and the importance of the correct use of terrain."²⁹ This game was initially developed by two students in the 1974-1975 class. The Combined Arms Tactical Training Simulator represents a different type of simulation. This computer controlled system trains maneuver battalion commanders and staff officers in the control and coordination of combined arms operations, and it emphasizes the importance of decisions and coordination within a tactical operations center during combat.³⁰ When this system was first tested in April 1976 on a battalion commander and his staff from the 1st Infantry Division, the tested command group was initially reluctant to even participate, since they thought they were being pulled away from more important duties at their home station. After the test was completed, however, the battalion commander enthusiastically stated it was probably the best training experience he had ever had.

To assist in the exportation of these battle simulations, some of the students in the 1975-1976 class who will be assigned to active Army units or to reserve component duty with Readiness Regions are receiving special training in battle simulations, training management, and the Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP). As training development "missionaries," these officers will furnish assistance and

advice to units in the field on the utilization of battle simulations. An instructor training course for active Army, reserve, and National Guard officers is also envisioned. To further implement the program, the College is writing battalion, brigade and eventually division ARTEP's which will be conducted without troops and which will include the battle simulations.

The long-term impact of School Model 76 and Training Developments on the Command and General Staff College is still not known, but most of the faculty presently regard the programs with suspicion. One supporter of the programs explained, "The old hands are still the educators. There are just a few training converts here." If the two programs are rigorously applied, the effect could be dramatic and could bring about the demise of many of the educational reforms accomplished during the past decade. For example, the determination and teaching of critical tasks could mean the return to a pre-eminent emphasis on fundamentals, and a decline in emphasis on "mind-broadening" studies. On the other hand, determination of the critical tasks could also enable the College to perform its mission more efficiently, since instruction applying to only a small segment of the students could theoretically be eliminated. But if its major purpose becomes the exportation of training to units or agencies outside Fort Leavenworth, the College will embark on a mission unique to its nearly 100 years of existence. The final effect of such a revolutionary change in mission can only be a matter of conjecture.

ENDNOTES

CHAPTER SIX

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Chapter 7

Conclusion

The story of the Command and General Staff College after World War II is a story of unremitting change, but three basic questions remained in the center of the arena of change. These questions concerned the relationship of education and training, the balancing of the generalist against the specialist, and the broadening of the scope of instruction. These problems have confronted each commandant during the past three decades.

Considering the relationship between education and training, the necessity to emphasize "mind-broadening" courses became prevalent during the late 1950's, or at least in the early 1960's. Leavenworth recognized that the intellectual development of the officer was as important, or more important than training him in a few, select skills. As the machines of war became more complicated, as the role of the Army officer became more complex, and as the potential varieties of war itself became more numerous, the College slowly recognized that the student could not be exposed in the classroom to every possible eventuality that might some day face him. The long-term evolution of the curriculum thus emphasized the educational aspects of intellectual development, rather than the specific aspects of a particular job. The officer could no longer learn a formula for every problem he might face. In that sense, Leavenworth tried to teach the student how to apply his mental facilities to solving the multitudinous problems that might appear on the modern battlefield, or that might be confronted somewhere other than on the battlefield.

The question of the generalist versus the specialist was an integral part of this problem, but no viable solution was offered until the Haines Board met in 1966. During the 1946--1950 period CGSC attempted to provide some functionalized training, but this proved to be an unsuccessful endeavor. From 1950 to 1967, every student took the same course at Leavenworth, with the exception of those involved in the Master of Military Art and Science Program or those taking courses from civilian universities. These courses, however, were in addition to the standard course work for every student. The traditional Leavenworth graduate, thus, was the complete generalist who was prepared for a variety of positions within the general staff, but who was predominantly trained in division operations.

After the Haines Board released its recommendations, the College moved slowly toward providing some specialized course work within the over-all program of producing a generalist. The growth of the electives program reflects the gradual acceptance of the need to provide the generalist some specialized training. With the implementation of the Officer Personnel Management System, the College fully entered into graduating the generalist who had received additional training in his primary and secondary specialties. Establishing the delicate balance between the competing demands of the generalist and the specialist, however, remained a problem.

The great broadening of the scope of instruction reflects the trend toward producing the generalist and the specialist, and providing education and training. As the College moved into presenting electives in specialized fields, its curriculum became more complex than at any other

time in its history. As it moved more toward education, many intellectual development courses such as strategic studies, military history, and even automatic data processing made that curriculum even more complex. At the same time CGSC was gradually forced into the difficult situation of teaching practically every military unit and organization. The Gerow Board of 1946 had recommended the establishment of a ground college, responsible for teaching the division and the corps, but CGSC was required to reach the span of units from division to Army group. The Eddy Board of 1949 also attempted to reduce the scope of the Leavenworth curriculum by recreating the Army War College. The Williams Board of 1958 strongly emphasized that the division had to be the focus of Leavenworth's curriculum. But in each case, the curriculum rapidly assumed a more extensive scope, rather than being more narrow. In 1973, the curriculum became even broader with the addition of the new levels of battalion and brigade. As the years have passed, the curriculum has slowly become more and more intricate.

The underlying reason for the difficulty has been the basic nature of the student. That is, he represents a broad range of talents and capabilities practically every branch and OPMS specialty, and every level of experience. As the Army's equipment, organizations, methods and problems have become more intricate and advanced, fulfilling the educational needs of the officer corps has also increased in complexity. That task has become one of the most difficult missions that could face a single educational institution.

By 1973 the Command and General Staff College had progressed

significantly along the path toward meeting the complex needs of the Leavenworth student. Perhaps the greatest single step was taken when the College decided to implement the electives program vigorously. In a real sense, the College could then provide both education and training, could meet the competing demands of the generalist and the specialist, and could at least partially limit the scope of instruction in the common curriculum. The electives, however, added another dimension to problem of curriculum complexity and the demand for competent instructors became even more pressing, since many specialized courses required a high degree of instructor expertise. But by 1973 the College recognized that simple formulas no longer sufficed to solve sophisticated and advanced problems, and that the educational needs of every student were not the same.

When Major General Cushman came to Leavenworth in 1973, his plans for sweeping changes alienated a large segment of the faculty. This portion of the faculty was understandably proud of the evolution of the College curriculum, and believed the new Commandant did not understand the institution he was "destroying". Their emotions were deeply felt, and in many ways their pride was hurt. For that reason they perceived the Cushman changes as being destructive rather than constructive, and revolutionary rather than evolutionary. What many failed to recognize was how General Cushman's changes were closely linked with the past, and how they were to carry many of the reforms of the past decade to a higher point. That is, the progressive trends had been toward education rather than training, toward establishing a delicate balance between the competing needs of the generalist and the specialist, and

toward somehow molding the scope of instruction into a manageable form. General Cushman accelerated the development of those trends.

Looking back today, most members of the faculty concede that further change was necessary, and many often conclude with the same remark. "General Cushman took two years to make changes that probably would have taken someone else five years." Most now recognize that the Command and General Staff College is a better institution because of General Cushman's reforms, for while his rapid changes seem to be revolutionary, most were a continuation or fruition of the evolutionary changes of the past. During the past several years, the entire curriculum has been exposed to a detailed analysis, and much of the irrelevant, outdated, or redundant material has been eliminated. The instruction has become more realistic and challenging, and a more productive and stimulating educational environment has been created. General Cushman accelerated the educational trend of the past and even managed to apply it to the Tactics Department, which is finally experiencing a progressive change in the techniques it has always employed. For the first time in more than a decade, major improvements have been made in methods of instruction. The use of small work groups and the case study method has successfully converted the student from a passive learner to an active participant in the educational process. After a rough beginning, the electives program has also been improved in content and in effectiveness. The projected reduction from ten to eight electives in Academic Year 1976-1977 and the increase from ten to twelve meetings are positive steps in making the electives contribute even more significantly to the Leavenworth curriculum. One of the most important reforms has been the reintroduction of the real Army into the classroom as a subject of study. The abstract,

academic version that previously existed only in the classrooms of Bell Hall has hopefully disappeared for good. In the truest sense, Leavenworth reached a higher level of excellence as a result of the driving leadership of General Cushman.

The progress of the past few years, nonetheless, was not achieved without costs. After analyzing the question of changes at the Command and General Staff College in 1933, General George C. Marshall wrote:

"To issue an edict or regulation would probably do more harm than good. The job must be a personal one, to be effected slowly as faculty minds, physical means, and other tangible factors are gradually rounded into shape for each step. Sudden changes in an educational plant are bound to be destructive, and any material changes must be timed by the men on the ground."¹

The changes from 1973 to 1976 were not done "slowly" and were not "timed by the men on the ground." Consequently, when the major changes were implemented in 1974-1975, some of the program was not as developed or as polished as it should have been. One officer explained:

"Major General Cushman was the only one who really knew what he wanted to do with the school. He just couldn't communicate where he wanted it to go. The first year here was hell because of the uncertainty. The changes were on the way but would have occurred more slowly...."

On the balance, however, it should be recognized that a Commandant has only two or possibly three years to implement change. Since a Commandant's first year is virtually "lost," programs of change often lose their continuity and sometimes their support when he leaves. If a major change is to be accomplished by an incumbent Commandant, it almost has to be completed and implemented before a new Commandant arrives. Otherwise, there will almost certainly be a dilution of change and a residual inability to truly accomplish reforms.

Ironically, the relatively short tours of Commandants, which are intended to keep Leavenworth current with the outside Army, often prevent the continuation and successful fruition of promising, forward-thinking programs. The short tours also often expose the College to too much change. That is, every commandant is an individual with his own perceptions of the needs of the Leavenworth graduate, and each has acted to ensure that the graduate possesses the qualities and skills the incumbent Commandant considers most important. Differing perception of different Commandants, however, can result in the beginning of a new cycle of change before an earlier cycle has been completed.

Since General Cushman remained through the first half of Academic Year 1975-1976, he was at Leavenworth long enough to correct some of the shortcomings in the curriculum that became evident in 1974-1975 and to begin planning and writing the curriculum for 1976-1977. During the past two and a half years, many changes that seemed revolutionary in 1973 and 1974 have gradually become the Leavenworth method. Most of the faculty that taught under the previous system will have rotated before the beginning of Academic Year 1976-1977, and thus the College will have a faculty that hardly remembers the complaints and reservations expressed more than two years previously. If a new Commandant desires to make changes, he will undoubtedly encounter the same inertia and resistance encountered by General Cushman in 1973-1974. This time, however, it will come from a faculty accustomed to teaching under the philosophy and methodology of General Cushman. To say that they all support that philosophy and methodology, however, would be incorrect.

Change will undoubtedly continue to be an important part of the tradition of Leavenworth, for it is that ability to change that has ensured the continued, progressive evolution of the College. As warfare, the Army, and American society evolve, the curriculum, organization, and methodology of Leavenworth should also evolve. The idea that a perfect curriculum can be created is dangerous not because it is pursued, but because someone may someday think he has found it. Then there would be no change. The curriculum would fall far behind what it should be. And Leavenworth would no longer serve as the focal point for the development of the American Army's thinking.

ENDNOTES

CHAPTER SEVEN

¹Quoted in Forrest C. Pogue, George C. Marshall: Education of a General (New York: The Viking Press, 1963), p. 249.

Table 1

Hours of Instruction in
Tactical Operations

	1938-1939	1944	1947-1948 (Common Only)	1949-1950 (Common Only)	1950-1951	1951-1952	1953-1954	1954-1955	1955-1956	1956-1957	1957-1958	1958-1959	1959-1960	1960-1961	1961-1962	1962-1963	1963-1964	1964-1965	1965-1966	1966-1967	1967-1968 (One Elective)	1968-1969	1969-1970	1970-1971 (Two Electives)	1971-1972	1972-1973 (Six Electives)	1973-1974
Division	225	163	227	214	413	401	364	378	349	309	403	398	351	372	366	312	303	288	285	270	289	224	237	238	230	143	139
Corps	152	10	107	112	138	135	119	153	183	210	75	63	78	75	69	54	66	66	66	66	74	67	69	81	72	28	30
Army	0	24	80	48	101	129	119	86	88	66	45	48	42	42	30	30	33	39	39	42	42	39	39	27	35	18	10
Total	377	197	414	374	652	665	602	617	620	585	523	509	471	489	465	396	402	393	390	378	405	330	345	346	337	199	179

(Common Curriculum only...)

TABLE 2a
CONTENT OF CURRICULUM ACCORDING TO STAFF AREAS

	(1945) (Ground Course)	(1946-1947) (Common Only)	(1953-1954)	(1955-1956)	(1957-1958)	(1958-1959)	(1959-1960)	(1960-1961)	(1962-1963)	(1965-1966)
Operations	66.4	39.5	53.8	54.3	48.6	41.7	40	40	44.1	42
Intelligence	11.1	7.6	---	12.6	15.8	17.0	18	18	13.1	11
Logistics	7.0	35.1	---	24.5	22.2	25.6	26	26	20.4	16
Personnel	6.3	11.5	---	6.8	10.7	10.8	11	11	8.8	6
Other	9.2	6.3	---	1.8	2.7	4.9	5	5	13.6	25
Total	100.0%	100.0%		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100%	100%	100.0%	100%

The breakdown of the curriculum according to content was done by contemporary officers. None of the percentages were computed by the author.

TABLE 3
 TURNOVER AMONG COLONELS ON ACADEMIC COMMITTEES
 1973-1975^a

DEPARTMENT OF COMMAND

<u>Directors</u>	<u>Deputy Dir.</u>	<u>Staff Opns</u>	<u>Management^b</u>	<u>Prof. of Arms</u>
Hynes	Richardson	Berke	Millener	Millener
Hendricks	----- ^c	Evans	Richardson	Hausman
	Fitzpatrick	Von Schiemmer	Stone (LTC)	

DEPARTMENT OF TACTICS

<u>Directors</u>	<u>Deputy Dir.</u>	<u>Committee 1</u>	<u>Committee 2</u>	<u>Doctrine</u>
White	Peirce	Brophy	Bartholdt	London
Smith	London	Hendricks	Von Schlemmer	Evans
Hynes	Dodge	Tate	Washer	London
Louisell	Katt			Gazlay
Robertson				

DEPARTMENT OF STRATEGY

<u>Directors</u>	<u>Deputy Dir.</u>	<u>Strat Stud.</u>	<u>Jt. & Comb. Opns</u>	<u>Sec. Assist.</u>
Sanger	Orr	Chapman	Malouche	Phillips
Chapman	Weafer	Weigand	Dodge	Springman
Manion		DeWitt		

DEPARTMENT OF LOGISTICS

<u>Directors</u>	<u>Deputy Dir</u>
Weaver	Manning
Middleton	Rackley

DEPARTMENT OF RESIDENT
INSTRUCTION

Directors
 Brown
 Welch
 Sanger
 Ring
 Allee

^aData was obtained from the Executive Officers of Departments concerned on 10 April 1976.

^bAlso known as Leadership and Management Committee prior to subdivision in Academic Year 1974-1975.

^cNo occupant for one year.

TABLE 4

REGULAR COURSE GRADUATES

Regular Course	Number of U.S. Students	Number of Allied Students	Total
1946-1947	251	68	319
1947-1948	433	44	477
1948-1949	363	52	415
1949-1950	440	45	485
1950-1951	351	38	389
1951-1952	531	61	592*
1952-1953	527	60	587
1953-1954	528	64	592
1954-1955	529	72	601
1955-1956	543	76	619
1956-1957	534	80	614
1957-1958	532	80	612
1958-1959	538	80	618
1959-1960	669	81	750**
1960-1961	657	84	741
1961-1962	656	85	741
1962-1963	663	79	742
1963-1964	667	79	746
1964-1965	667	80	747
1965-1966	660	76	736
1966-1967	703	77	780
1967-1968	1244	97	1341***
1968-1969	1244	96	1340
1969-1970	1244	96	1340
1970-1971	1248	103	1351
1971-1972	1249	96	1345
1972-1973	1008	94	1102
1973-1974	1009	97	1106
1974-1975	1008	97	1105
1975-1976	1008	94	1102

*Gruber Hall Rebuilt

**Bell Hall Opened

***Associate Course Abolished

Bibliographic Essay

A wide variety of sources was consulted in the preparation of this study. The sources for the earlier years were predominantly written with War Department and Department of the Army studies being particularly useful. The various educational surveys were also valuable, for they provided views and opinions on the Army education system from professional educators outside the military. For the later years a balanced use of written materials and interviews was attempted. Catalogs, memoranda, letters, and studies pertaining to the College were examined. Although all correspondence was not made available to the study team, more than enough information was located to permit an impartial and thorough evaluation of the recent years of the College. Thirty-nine interviews were conducted with current and past members of CGSC. The officers interviewed included the Commandant, Deputy Commandant, Education Advisor, eight present or past directors of departments, and a number of instructors or members of the staff. An attempt was made to balance the interviews between higher ranking officers who had acted as department directors and committee chiefs, and lower ranking officers who had acted as instructors or author/instructors.

At the end of the research, one fact was apparent; there was no commonly held perception of the exact nature of the changes which transpired during the recent years. The differences in perceptions expressed by those interviewed made quantification of responses impossible. Consequently, the ideas and conclusions expressed in this paper are based upon an evaluation of the articulated perceptions of those interviewed and upon an inter-

pretation of documents available. Very few of the insights expressed are original, which is a tribute to the highly professional faculty that must wrestle with the consequences of dynamic change within the Army today. As long as there remains these officers who are willing to struggle with and master change, the future of the Command and General Staff College and the Army at large is assured.

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